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Abstract:
In the current economic crisis, left and progressive political economy has enjoyed renewed
attention and credibility, both inside and outside of academia. This Working Paper has two
goals. First, it surveys the important recent contributions to this literature by Robert Brenner,
David Harvey, and Robert Pollin, summarizing key arguments and identifying generative
research questions and theoretical heuristics for further inquiry. Second, it reads these works
alongside several tendencies in the recent history of the Anglo-American left and considers
how they might help to forge more fruitful dialogue between analyses of social movements
and economic structures, too often studied apart. Throughout, the paper stresses the
importance of retaining the robust critical power of the left critique while avoiding the
fatalism, sectarianism, and “automatic” theories of social change that have bedeviled the left’s
recent past.
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New Critical Perspectives on the U.S. and the Post-WWII Global Economy: Brenner,
Harvey, and Pollin 1
Leftists in the 1990s lived amidst immense political confusion. One by one, though in
different ways, more and more of their brethren declared the socialist project dead and
finished. By the end of the 1990s, the radical British sociologist Anthony Giddens had
morphed into something new: a guiding theoretical light for “New Labour” prime minister
(and Giddens book blurber) Tony Blair and his Clintonite “Third Way” politics, what the
historian Tony Judt recently summarized as a program “ostensibly blending enthusiasm for
unconstrained capitalist production with due consideration for social outcomes and the
collective interest.” 2 The most trenchant criticisms generally came only from the most
marginalized quarters, like that of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) theoretician Alex
Callinicos, who saw Third Wayism as little more than a variant of “left in essence, right in
form.” 3
Not all of those who called it a day did so by hopping on the capitalist bandwagon.
Some like Eric Hobsbawm, after a decade of attempts at liberal-left rapprochement within the
British Labour Party, simply threw up a huge question mark. 4 He concluded his history of the
20th century, The Age of Extremes, in poignantly anguished tones, foreseeing potential
“darkness” and impending “historic crisis,” while at a loss as to what the alternatives might
be. What he offered amounted to little more than vagaries: “The future cannot be a

1

Please send comments to Merlin Chowkwanyun, Department of History, Public Health Studies, 208 College
Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19147. E-mail: merlinc@sas.upenn.edu
2
Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Tony
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 794-96.
3
Alex Callinicos, Against the Third Way (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
4
A summary of this episode, useful for constructing Hobsbawm’s political trajectory, is in Eric Hobsbawm,
Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life (New York: New Press, 2005 [2002]), ch. 16.
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continuation of the past,” “It [the world] must change," though into what, he could not say. 5
His autobiography, published about a decade later, ends on a similar equivocal note: “I am not
surprised to find myself once again among a generation that distrusts capitalism, though it no
longer believes in our alternative to it.” 6 On American hegemony specifically, Hobsbawm
could only say: “As I am eighty-five years of age I am unlikely to see its solution.” 7
Meanwhile, Russell Jacoby’s 1999 The End of Utopia depicted several lamentable
trends among (self-defined) “radical” intellectuals: among them, perpetual abstract theory
theorizing about abstract theory; esotericism and indecipherable, neologistic prose justified
for its purported subversive qualities; and a flight to technocratic amelioration and away from
bolder emancipatory political vision. With concern, he wrote:
The issue is the decline of a utopian vision that once imbued leftists and liberals. The
point is hardly that improved air, enhanced welfare or a broader democracy is bad.
The question, rather, is the extent a commitment to reasonable measures supplants a
commitment to unreasonable ones – those more subversive and visionary. Can
liberalism with a backbone exist if its left turns mushy? Does radicalism persist if
reduced to means and methods? Does a left survive if it abandons a utopian hope or
plan? 8
One might underscore Jacoby’s sketch by examining none other than his own corpus. The
author of some of the most influential 1970s theoretical contributions to American Marxist
thought now often serves up little more than periodic pleas for the left to digest Strunk and
White. This is a laudable proposition, for sure, but hardly breakthrough or novel, especially
when issued so periodically. 9

5

Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996
[1994]), 583-84.
6
Hobsbawm, Interesting Times, 414.
7
Ibid., 410.
8
Russell Jacoby, The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy (New York: Basic Books, 1999),
25. See ch. 1 for an extended list of examples.
9
See, for example, Jacoby, “Big Brains, Small Impact,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 11 January 2008;
Jacoby, “Excellent Writers, Facile Thinkers,” Chronicle Review, 2 February 2007. Nevertheless, the plea can
come off as highly amusing – for example, his recent review of Eric Lott’s The Disappearing Liberal
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Shortly afterwards, the Marxist geographer and theorist David Harvey (two of whose
books are under review) made a similar observation. Reminiscing on how the packed
attendance at his 1970s Marxist reading groups and courses had diminished more and more
over the years, the hold-out Harvey lamented:
I rarely – if ever – see any faculty members, and the graduate student audience has
largely disappeared. Marx is largely written off in self-styled ‘radical’ circles as the
weaver of an impossibly huge and monolithic master narrative of history, an advocate
of some totally impossible historical transformation that has in any case been proven
by events (the collapse of the Wall) to be just as fallacious politically and practically
as it always was theoretically. To pretend there is anything interesting about Marx
after 1989 is to sound more and more like an all-but-extinct dinosaur whimpering its
own last rites. Free-market capitalism rides triumphantly across the globe, slaying all
such old dinosaurs in its path. 10
“The end of history is at hand,” wrote Harvey, mockingly (up until recently, it was hard to
tell). Whether in or outside the academy, it seemed that many leftists had imbibed a leftinverse version of Francis Fukuyama’s. It was time to “get practical,” embrace a “politics of
the possible,” understand the need to “be realistic,” realize “that era is over,” while working
“from within.” Phrases like this became a chorus in a post-1989 world and made some
wonder what purpose the left as a distinct political entity even served.
The most rigorous and extended statement reflecting the new leftist mood, however,
came in January 2000. In the New Left Review, readers opened to “Renewals,” a lengthy
meditation by one of the world’s most influential living Marxist thinkers, Perry Anderson.
His essay identified two major strands of recent left response – “accommodation” and
“consolation” -- to what he called the “neo-liberal grand slam of the nineties.” He repudiated
both, yet some readers remained frustrated at what they saw as left fatalism. “What is the

Intellectual, Jacoby, “Brother From Another Planet,” The Nation, 10 April 2006. But the critique ultimately
amounts to little more than a sarcastic disquisition on basic composition.
10
David Harvey, “Introduction to the Verso Edition” in Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso Books,
1999 [1982]), xiv. [hereafter referred to as Harvey, Limits]
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principal aspect of the past decade?” Anderson asked. “Put briefly, it can be defined as the
virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal diffusion, of neo-liberalism.” Those who
foresaw any near-term reversal of these developments were kidding themselves, and the New
Left Review would have no part in it. The journal would instead become “uncompromising in
both senses: refusing any accommodation with the ruling system, and rejecting every piety
and euphemism that would understate its power.” It would not “lend credence to illusions
that the system is moving in a steadily progressive direction,” especially with “no collective
agency able to match the power of capital is yet on the horizon.” For Anderson, “the only
starting-point for a realistic Left today” was “a lucid registration of historical defeat. Capital
has comprehensively beaten back all threats to its rule, the bases of whose power—above all,
the pressures of competition—were persistently under-estimated by the socialist
movement.” 11 These were powerful words from someone who, nearly a century before, had
opened one of his works with Lenin’s famous maxim on intellectuals and social movements,
which declared that “correct revolutionary theory assumes final shape only in close
connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement.”
Much of Anderson’s output had examined the huge costs that the theory-practice gulf
extracted on the vitality of the left. 12 Now, he seemed to conclude that the possibilities for the
“practice” aspect were miniscule and futile.
The response to the Anderson piece varied widely. The most forceful denunciation
came from Boris Kagarlitsky, a once regular New Left Review contributor, who mocked
Anderson and depicted him as insular and patronizing: “In essence, what we have before us is
a very refined, gentlemanly form of unconditional capitulation to an ideological foe. Perry
11

Perry Anderson, “Renewals,” New Left Review, no. 1, series 2 (January/February 2000).
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breaks his sword and surrenders himself to the mercy of the victor, but as a true gentleman he
does this with dignity and style.” 13 Both Anderson and Kagarlitsky’s pieces appeared shortly
after November 1999, when unexpected protests successfully disrupted the Seattle meeting of
the World Trade Organization. The protestors made up an unlikely coalition –
environmentalists, labor unions, anarchists, sweatshop activists, sectarians, and others. But
what moved so many observers, this writer included (at the time in high school), were the
spontaneity and the vitality of the protests. For a short while, it seemed Seattle might
represent a harbinger of things to come, the launching of a broad new movement countering a
decade of demoralization and acquiescence. Would it make Anderson look prematurely
pessimistic?
No, responded Tariq Ali, one of the most prominent leaders of the British New Left, in
his riposte to the Kagalaritsky piece. “Seattle,” Ali wrote, “was extremely invigorating, but
neither that nor the strike wave in France amount[ed] to a fundamental change in the situation.
To exaggerate will only increase the despair. To recognize what has happened does not mean
a passive acceptance of the status quo.” This was, Ali concluded, a “different epoch from the
one which Lenin described as one of ‘wars and revolutions.’” 14
More time and more reflection on Seattle seemed to vindicate Ali’s assessment of the
1999 events. In a trenchant critique of the Seattle legacy, the writers Liza Featherstone, Doug
Henwood, and Christian Parenti reflected, too, upon what might be called “the Seattle’s
model’s” anti-intellectualism and the frequent premium that its adherents placed on collective

12

See especially Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: Verso Books, 1979 [1976]);
Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
13
Boris Kagarlitsky, “The Suicide of New Left Review,” International Socialist Journal, no. 88 (Autumn 2000).
14
Tariq Ali, "Third Period in Outer-Space: A Brief Comment on Boris Kagarlitsky's Suicide,” ZNet ca. late 2000
<http://www.zmag.org/tariqali.htm>.
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action and street demonstration above all else. 15 Many contemporary protestors, they argued,
often possessed little basic understanding of capitalism’s concrete dynamics beyond casting it
in moral terms and understanding it to be morally evil. They labeled this tendency
“activistism,” a “brave new ideology combin[ing] the political illiteracy of hyper-mediated
American culture with all the moral zeal of a nineteenth century temperance crusade.”
“Thoughtless activism,” they warned, ultimately “tends to confuse the formulation of political
aims.” 16 Indeed, organizationally, the 1999 demonstrations have left little to cheer about: an
increase in street theater and puppeteering, sporadic and decentralized local protests with tiny
attendance, city-wide bicycle rides, and ephemeral one-day mass marches that end as soon as
they begin with little momentum retained. At times, one wonders whether these protests are
less about trying to affect consequences than they are about satisfying the existential kicks of
their self-indulgent participants.
The confusion and disappointment of the 1990s persisted well into the next decade,
but they came with new twists. President George W. Bush’s decision to wage war and
occupation on Iraq in 2003 faced some of the largest global protests in history, with
attendance at some rallies exceeding the million mark. But this one-day energy burst failed to
stop the war or to alter the positions of the two pro-war United States presidential candidates
in 2004, all of which led to intense feelings of futility. By 2007, day-long demonstrations saw
low participation, while mainstream politicians continued to propose half-hearted measures

15

Henwood’s significant body of work deserves serious appraisal from left academics – one that it has yet to
receive. Due to spatial constraints, I have decided to take up his two-decade examination of American politics,
economics, and culture in a separate essay.
16
Liza Featherstone, Doug Henwood, Christian Parenti, “‘Action Will Be Taken’: Left Anti-Intellectualism and
its Discontents,” Radical Society vol. 29, no. 1 (April 2002), 27.
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for ending the war (with some simultaneously suggesting engagement against Iran). 17 Little
that resembled a “mass movement” (against war or anything) seemed to exist.
At the same time, American might began to exhibit great vulnerability. At the start of
the 21st century, the speculative stock market boom burst and sent the United States into brief
economic recession. The endeavor in Iraq fared poorly, calling into question United States
military supremacy. Within its own borders, the government’s disastrous handling of the
2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster exacerbated, for some, an image of decline. 18 The 2002
Enron, WorldCom (and others) scandals proved a public image relations disaster for
American corporations, though a short-lived one. As early as 2005, stories began appearing
about slumping home prices and increasing lapsed payments on mortgages. At the same time,
reports of record bonuses and salaries still cluttered the pages of the New York Times real
estate section and outlets of bourgeois and ruling class celebration like New York.
But by 2007, the early signs had exploded into record levels of foreclosures, unpaid
loans, and enormous economic volatility. Anecdotal stories in newspapers and magazines
reported once comfortable households having their assets seized by troubled banks, which
were cutting workforces and facing new strains as a result. Stock indices veered wildly, on
some days setting records, while on others falling dismally by three digits. Major banks and
hedge funds scaled back and shut down operations, laid off workers, and announced
reductions in future hiring. In 2008, one of the nation’s largest investment banks, Bear
Stearns, required a complex government-engineered bailout, while another, Lehman Brothers,
eventually filed for bankruptcy protection. Radical restructuring of their peer institutions has
followed. In October 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average saw one-week declines of
17

Alexander Cockburn, “Whatever Happened to the Anti-War Movement?,” New Left Review no. 46, series 2
(July/August 2007).
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more than 20%, resulting in the hasty (and, in execution, seemingly impromptu) Troubled
Assets Relief Program through which the federal government would purchase “toxic” assets
and re-capitalize banks. With a new president, new year, and cautious optimism among some
came also devastating news about rising unemployment (7.2%) and a dramatic slowdown in
global growth. 19
What does the left offer to make sense of this? The recent contributions of Robert
Brenner, David Harvey, and Robert Pollin are absolutely essential to anyone hoping to make
some sense of capital’s recent history and where it might be headed. Brenner examines the
United States post-WWII economy in global perspective, identifying a worrisome
longitudinal trend and the enduring mechanism behind it, all of which exacerbate increasing
and more frequent economic instability. In one of two books, Harvey characterizes “neoliberalism” as a new and recent phase in capitalist development and examines the interplay
among its economic, political, and ideological components. In another, he revisits a classic
Marxist problem – the exact relationship between capital and state’s prerogatives in
imperialist endeavors – and reflects upon how recent developments require theoretical
revision. Finally, Pollin focuses more closely on the 1990s under the Clinton regime and
finds a record that is severely wanting.
Hope and disappointment have recently seemed intertwined and reinforcing: the
failing but protracted war effort without an anti-war movement to stop it; the possibility of a
capitalism heading towards implosion but with the poorest Americans experiencing it first and
worst; the emergence of mass left movements and government in Latin America with new
18
19

Michael Hardt, “From Imperialism to Empire,” The Nation, 31 July 2006.
“Employment Situation Summary,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, December 2008.
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questions about their political longevity and actual ability to transcend neo-liberal
hegemony. 20 Was American capitalism about to implode, on the wane, merely experiencing a
few bumps, stagnant but sturdy, or highly turbulent but ultimately durable? What were the
implications for strategy? Did the increasing left pessimism of the 1990s deserve vindication
or had its proponents in fact failed to foresee new openings and possibilities on the horizon,
especially in the current moment? These books do not offer decisive answers, of course, but
they are crucial to clearing some initial fog.
***
The Marxist historian Robert Brenner’s The Boom and the Bubble: The U.S. in the
World Economy is an important event for the left and for post-WWII American
historiography. Few general surveys of the economy for this time period come close to its
empirical heft, geographic scope, and explanatory ambition. Brenner’s project first appeared
as a New Left Review book-length special issue in 1998 against bullish rhetoric and “New
Economy” boosterism that seemed at odds with its implicit warnings – a milieu captured
brilliantly in Doug Henwood’s After the New Economy. 21 Boom is one of a series of works
on the historical origins of the recent global economy and focuses particularly on the United
States’s central role. 22 And though Brenner’s analysis has ignited much worldwide debate
among left activists and scholars since its debut, it has made little to no dent on mainstream

<http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm>; “World Economic Outlook Update: Global Economic
Slump Challenges Policies,” International Monetary Fund, January 2009
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/index.htm>
20
On this last point, see the critical examinations of the Lula Brazilian regime and its disappointments in
Monthly Review, February 2007.
21
See Henwood, After the New Economy (New York: New Press, 2003), esp. chs. 1 and 5.
22
Robert Brenner, “The Economics of Global Turbulence: A Special Report on the World Economy,” New Left
Review, no. 229, series 1 (May-June 1998). A revised version with updated data is in Brenner, The Economics of
Global Turbulence (New York: Verso Books, 2006). Global Turbulence provides more thorough analysis of the
Japanese and German economies. This paper will focus on Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the
World Economy (New York: Verso Books, 2002) because of its United States emphasis.
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academia or the post-WWII American history subfield itself. This likely stems in part from
the long-standing relegation of economic history to economics departments, an especially
regrettable and entrenched development given the political and methodological dogmas of the
latter, and an aversion to economics or quantitative methodology in the former. 23 It is doubly
unfortunate because Brenner’s project offers so much to scholars working on very disparate
topics. Whether gentrification, the decline of social spending, urban capital flight, or the
stagnation of the labor movement, among others, it is hard to think of many areas unaffected
by the backdrop of economic turbulence, and yet the developments that Brenner describes
have yet to be interwoven into most post-WWII accounts.
Throughout his career, Brenner has exhibited a talent for attracting attention and
generating controversy, whether through accusing fellow historians of Early Modern Britain
of a neo-Malthusian demographic determinism or his politically unfashionable critiques of
dependence theory and Third World Marxism. 24 Much of this stems from a preference for
bold causal explanations forcefully counterposed against prevailing interpretations, left or
right. Boom continues this style of presentation. Behind the stunning array of graphs, charts,
data, and policies lies an elegant and simple core explanation for post-WWII stagnation,
followed by turbulence. For Brenner, it is capital’s tendency toward over-capacity (redundant
and decreasingly used sunk capital – machinery, physical plants, etc.) and over-production
(hereafter referred to as o-c/o-p) of unsellable goods (or goods with prices that cannot be
marked up), all resulting from increased competition. This in turn leads to stagnant economic
23

The split has century-old roots, described briefly in Ian Tyrrell, The Absent Marx: Class Analysis and Liberal
History in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 34-36.
24
These now classic essays, along with responses from several scholars, are collected in T.H. Aston and C.H.E.
Philpin, eds., The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial
Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For Brenner’s critique of dependence theory and Third
Worldism, principally Monthly Review Marxism, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Andre Gunder Frank, see Brenner,
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growth, eventual falling rates of profit, and a scramble by both capital and state to stop and
reverse the trend. Their efforts, Boom argues, do not succeed beyond the short term and end
up creating more volatility. Brenner captures the dialectical dynamics of the most recent
years succinctly: “The boom thus opened the way to the bubble; the bubble blew up the boom
a good deal further; and the explosion of the bubble under its own pressure ultimately put an
end to the boom.” 25
Brenner views the post-WWII economy as a roller coaster, and the problem of o-c/o-p
is the fundamental trigger and mechanism that gets the trolley rolling. One can divide his
narrative into seven (occasionally overlapping) stages. 26 In stage one, from 1948-1965, the
American economy experienced an overall post-WWII boom reflected in a variety of
indicators, including higher growth in GDP, profit, wages, labor productivity, and social
spending rates. This is not to say that there were not some sharp declines within short
periods, but the rates eventually recovered as the United States retained healthy internal, and
to a lesser extent, external markets for its goods. In stage two, from 1965-1973, these figures,
most importantly the manufacturing rate of profit (with the exception of labor productivity)
began to decline due to the onset of foreign competition, especially from Japan and Germany.
In stage three, from 1973-1985, these growth rates continued to decline (and now labor
productivity as well) but less dramatically, instead settling into a decade-long period of
stagnation with few reversals, unlike those seen in the first stage. Brenner labels this post1973 period “the long downturn,” though “inverse plateau” might be a more accurate term.
During this stage, real wage growth also began to slow, then decline, as corporations
“The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” New Left Review, no. 104,
series 1 (July/August 1977).
25
Brenner, Boom, 3.
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accelerated wage cuts (along with layoffs) to counter their falling profit rates. In stage four,
from 1985-1993, some recovery occurred because of United States currency devaluation
negotiated in a meeting of the G-5 countries, now known as the Plaza Accord. The
devaluation made the United States much more competitive in the manufacturing export
economy and set the stage for a roughly decade-long turnaround. But this also created, in
Brenner’s words, a “zero-sum struggle, with winners and losers determined heavily by the
movement of exchange rates,” as the competitive advantage of one country that resulted from
a currency decrease invariably cut into the domestic markets of others, thus adding a new
potential cause of volatility. 27

United States manufacturing and non-manufacturing net profit rates in Brenner, 20

26

In addition to Boom, this section draws principally on Brenner, Economics of Global Turbulence, chs. 8, 1112.
27
Brenner, Boom, 159.
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United States, Germany, Japan manufacturing net profit rates in Brenner, 19

The years of stage five, from 1991-1998, saw a series of interconnected developments
that have contributed to the increasing volatility of the past two decades. In 1991, Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan implemented what in the latter part of his term would
become a regular series of deep Federal Reserve interest rate cuts designed to increase shortterm credit and investment. In these early years, as Brenner notes, Greenspan “between 1989
and 1993… had brought down real short-term interest rates from about 5 per cent to near-zero
to rescue failing banks and deeply indebted corporations in the wake of the S&L [Savings &
Loan] and commercial banks crises and the leveraged mergers and acquisitions debacle,” all
of which had contributed to the 1990-1991 recession. 28 This amounted to a preview run of
sorts of early 21st-century Greenspan conduct. (Greenspan would maintain higher rates
during most of the early half of the 1990s.) The most critical turning point came, however,
during a 1995 meeting in which the United States, Japan, and Germany agreed to modify their
28

Brenner, Boom, 173.
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currency exchange rates to offset a soaring Japanese yen and help revive a Japanese economy
that “appeared to be grinding to a halt.” 29 This Reverse Plaza Accord resulted in the end of
the decade-long post-1985 United States partial manufacturing recovery (partial because its
rates of profit still did not approach those of the post-WWII years) due to the non-competitive
pricing of American goods resulting from the currency readjustment.
The Reverse Accord’s consequences also unexpectedly reverberated into the nonJapanese East Asian economies, triggering the rapid events of stage six, the years of 19972000. These East Asian economies had grown in tandem with the United States’s recovery
from 1985-1995 because they had pegged their currencies to the now rising dollar. When the
value of the dollar rose and undercut American export competitiveness, the East Asian
economies experienced the same. Many foreign speculators with holdings there or other
economies (like Russia) were affected adversely, in turn, by the events. But in the United
States, the ramifications of the East Asian tumult (and reversal of manufacturing American
fortunes) were largely obscured by the simultaneous growth of what Brenner calls “stock
market Keynesianism,” an investment climate encouraged (culturally and materially) by
Greenspan’s enthused public pronouncements and a deregulated climate that created a flood
of easy credit and record levels of corporate and household borrowing. This led to the highest
ratios between equity prices and actual profits in American history with the sky-high equity
prices obscuring the persistent and dramatic inability of the actual profit rates to reach levels
of the immediate post-WWII years. Rampant speculation also resulted in a staggeringly high
level of o-c, as a stream of short-term speculation financed fiber-optic networking and other
fixed capital that would hardly be used (to this day), thus contributing to the o-c problem even
more. By spring of 2000, what amounted to an extended shell game could no longer continue,
29

Ibid., 131.
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as company after company (concentrated heavily in the technology sector) folded, leading to
stage seven, 2000-present.
In this current stage, Greenspan closed his career not by breaking from, but in fact
repeating, the very same pronouncements that had contributed to the late-1990s stock bubble
in the first place. Meanwhile, a series of deep interest rate cuts provided additional
momentary relief and a flush of credit, though this time, speculators moved to other areas of
investment, particularly real estate. An additional new variable emerged, too -- the rapid
increase in foreign-financed credit, especially from East Asian, particularly Chinese financiers
of late. 30 As in the late 1990s, the game (or at least one phase of it) began to end when profits
on investment failed to materialize, and lenders and creditors were faced with unpaid loans
and mounting debts. Although the degree of global volatility seen between the Reverse Plaza
Accord and the present is staggering, the number of short-term bandage solutions may be
declining, though they never fully worked in the first place, as the rates of manufacturing and
overall corporate profit failed to recover even to immediate post-WWII levels.
Brenner’s account is, in many ways, a heterodox one and a departure from the types of
explanations he has given in previous work on other eras. By identifying the problem of oc/o-p as the fundamental root of economic stagnation, Boom places an extraordinary
explanatory weight on a single contingent accident of immediate post-WWII history.
According to Brenner, the United States came out of the war in these years with a major
competitive advantage in manufacturing over its devastated industrial rivals elsewhere in the
world, thereby allowing American companies to invest massively in fixed capital and to
corner major domestic and export markets. But this advantage soon turned into a handicap as
other nations, especially Japan and Germany, recovered and began producing similar
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manufactured goods, thus cutting into the United States’s markets. These nations’ later entry
into the game turned into an unexpected advantage. Their start-up costs were considerably
less, given their use of (by then) older technology, and they could better anticipate the amount
of fixed capital needed to compete effectively. United States manufacturers, on the other
hand, found themselves stuck with an excess of sunk capital and goods. By 1965, the start of
the second stage in Brenner’s account, this became apparent with declines across a variety of
indicators, the rate of profit the most important and striking. All subsequent developments
thus follow from this structural configuration, portrayed here more as the then unforeseen
byproduct of the immediate post-WWII outcome.
But Brenner does not ignore human decision-making entirely. He devotes extended
sections to Alan Greenspan and the Plaza Accord negotiations, among others. At the same
time, Brenner risks casting almost all these actions as self-evidently logical responses of
capital and of state actors to the consequences of o-c/o-p. On occasion, the analysis even
takes on a rational-choice and functionalist feel. In the Brenner account, governments,
corporations, lenders, and the Federal Reserve all act the way one would expect them to act –
in a rational economic model, that is – towards a common goal, the attempt to reverse, or at
least stave off further, economic stagnation and decline, all rooted in the single mechanisms
that Brenner identifies in the post-WWII years. Portraying nation-to-nation currency power
plays, state-abetted speculation, wage cuts and layoffs, and capital flight and abandonment as
primarily reactive thus contributes to a depiction of the post-WWII economic development
less as a terrain of pro-active class antagonism (especially from the ruling class) than as a
chain reaction of logically flowing successive events.

30

Brenner, Boom, 206-9.
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This analysis stands in partial contrast to Brenner’s previous work on the emergence
of tripartite capitalist agriculture in Early Modern England. In those seminal pieces, he
dismissed the role of a single root structural mechanism – demographic expansion – and
instead offered one grounded in class antagonism and political struggle. From these processes
emerged new “social-property relations” in the form of the capitalist tenant-farmer and the
exploited landless wage-laborer, which gave rise to new competition and the imperative to
invest and innovate. 31 Here, Brenner places almost all emphasis on the latter “horizontal”
forces and downplays “vertical” relations, though those in the other direction, aiming his
critique at accounts that attribute declines in profitability to combinations of “upward” wage
and material gains. He notes that between 1950-1958, real wage growth stood at 3.6%,
between 1958-1956, at 2.2%, and between 1965-1973, at 1.9%, thereby demonstrating an
inverse correlation between real wage growth and stagnant or falling profit rates.
Furthermore, after 1973, real wage growth continued to fall in the long run as the profit rate
(and other indicators) never came close to their immediate post-WWII highs. 32 Some early
evaluations of Brenner have in my view mistakenly criticized him for slighting “vertical”
relations (in either direction) in supposed contrast to his prior work. It is for this exact reason,
however, that Brenner ought to earn praise, not scorn, within Marxist circles, for he has
formulated a narrative that uses the tradition generatively to evaluate given data rather than as
catechistic blueprint. But others like James Crotty have noted increases in the rate of unitlabor costs between 1965 and 1969, when profitability first began to fall, and have questioned
Brenner’s near total dismissal of upward pressure as an explanatory factor in profit rate
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reduction. 33 Brenner has in turn responded by acknowledging such empirical findings but
classifying them as medium-term cyclical or local fluctuations. He also draws a forceful
comparison to the non-manufacturing sector’s higher upward pressure but lower declines in
profit rates, arguing that only forces external to firms themselves – principally heightened
competition – can explain such declines. 34
Subsequent smaller-scale research projects – especially single-firm and single-sector
case studies – will continue debating Brenner’s conclusions, accepting, rejecting, or
reconciling them with prior explanations he attempts to overturn. But the future scholarship
in the wake of this work will only attest to its generative value. Robert Brenner has laid out a
crucial backdrop and agenda for years of inquiry into everything from the sustainability of
Keynesianism, the origins of recent monetary policy, the politics of currency regulation,
boardroom decision-making, the roots of late-century “financialization,” and the rise (and
retreat?) of political conservatism.
***
On this last point, analysts of American politics should take particular note, for
Brenner issues an implicit challenge to the burgeoning historical literature on the ascendance
of the New Right (broadly defined), and the myriad of thinktanks, intellectual works,
grassroots campaigns, and lobbying apparatuses that its authors claim have greatly influenced
recent American economic policy and anti-labor practices. But reading Brenner, one gets the
32
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impression that this mobilization constituted further reinforcement for (rather than cause of)
developments logically expected from capitalists in response to o-c/o-p and the falling rate of
profit. It is this author’s view that the New Right literature, whether dated to the New Deal
era, the early Cold War years, the Goldwater campaign, or the early years of Reaganism (or
elsewhere), indeed sometimes exaggerates the role of these entities. Politically, it has offered
liberal capitalists a convenient bogeyman – an all-powerful reified “New Right” – to blame
for nearly three decades of reaction, thus allowing them to avoid a structural indictment of
inherent capitalist dynamics that Brenner and generations of left political economists before
him have identified. 35 At the same time, many developments chronicled in that literature – the
grassroots tax revolts of the late 1970s, for one – do not appear easily explainable by and
subsumable to o-c/o-p and its discontents alone. Nor does the biggest legacy of the Reagan
and Thatcher era – the contraction of governmental social expenditures and the rapid
privatization (or outright limitation) of services. Indeed, the anti-labor, anti-tax policies and
mobilizations of private corporations, which stood to lose the most immediately from o-c/o-p,
are more easily compatible with Brenner’s account than those initiated independently by state
actors.
Still, Brenner does not derive much analytical mileage from the term “neo-liberalism,”
either, to describe a new phase in government policy. The post-WWII period instead appears
as a protracted long march with greater and greater volatility. Future accounts of capital and
state’s recent reactionary policies will more precisely blend the mobilization of various
entities, especially organized labor, with the longitudinal structural dynamics that Brenner
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describes but that are largely neglected in the post-WWII literature. More generally, scholars
will have to mediate between the Brenner account and local outcomes that depart significantly
from his timeline. We know, for example, that capital shakeout (whether in the form of flight,
attacks on labor, or shutdowns) occurred in many American cities far before the mid-1960s
slowdown or the early-1970s start of the long downturn. 36 The two 1970s oil shocks and their
impact on the American economy do not receive (on purpose) extended attention. More may
be at play in these specific cases besides just the aggregate decline in the rate of profit from oc/o-p induced by foreign competition (especially in years when it did not exist substantially),
and Brenner’s analysis occasionally comes off as slightly overreaching.
***
Apart from identifying an underexamined but highly significant historical engine,
Boom contains enormous political implications for the American left. Although Brenner does
not explicitly say so, his work, despite some critical departures, ultimately engages with two
Marxist theoretical traditions: stagnation and crisis, the latter of which examined the
possibility of capitalism’s collapse under the weight of its own inherent contradictions. For
some exemplars like Henryk Grossman, eventual collapse stems from o-c/o-p and the stagnant
or declining economic growth and rate of profit that results from it. Other variations of crisis
theory have proposed causes such as lack of external markets or underconsumption in the
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ones available. 37 But as Russell Jacoby argued more than 30 years ago in Telos, crisis
theory’s initially seductive appeal – in the end, the system will just annihilate itself -- could in
fact lead to considerable political ambiguity or even paralysis. As he surveyed various
versions of the theory, beginning with the late 19th-century Russian populists, Jacoby
bemoaned the increasing divorce between the political and the economic in “Marxist politicaleconomy,” arguing that the “political” had increasingly disappeared in crisis theory analysis.
Would collective human action be necessary to tip the scale? What would actually happen if
capitalism were to “collapse” if no political movement existed to fill the vacuum? Is a
“crisis” a crisis if there is no mass left movement to actually exploit it politically? Jacoby
concluded by cautiously endorsing the formulations of Paul Mattick, who concluded that
capitalism did indeed contain inherent contradictions that might aid its own collapse, but that
it could not do so without human political organization at the critical revolutionary moment. 38
For Jacoby, the failure of contemporary Marxism to combine political and economic analysis
caused him to declare that “the critique of bourgeois society – Marxism – has also succumbed
to it.” 39
More recently, Adolph Reed has similarly criticized structural Marxism’s legacy,
which he argues “supported a tendency to understate the space for meaningful human
intervention in politics.” “The result,” Reed continues, “was a form of theoretical narrative
emphasizing the power of entrenched patterns of relations and institutions and discounting the
possibilities for systematic change. A structuralist perspective is biased toward predicting
continuities; structural forces move inertially.” He concludes:
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To the extent that Marxism lost its moorings in the commitment to grounding inquiry
and interpretation in the objective of strategic intervention in class struggle – or any
other program of transformative practical action – this turn produced a radical
scholarship that more than mirrored the decline of the left outside the university; it
also often rationalized that decline and sanctified it in the language of scientific law. 40
Both the Jacoby and Reed critiques – one of scholarship that forecasts capitalism’s
breakdown, the other of work that posits its awesome durability – deserve serious attention as
one considers the political implications of Boom. Although the trope of crisis seems apparent,
Brenner is no crystal ball historian and too smart to predict impending breakdown (though in
a passing sentence, written in 2003, he more or less foresees the current housing bubble). He
instead ends on paradoxical and uncertain notes. On the one hand, the Ponzi economics of the
last one and a half decades, fueled by state-abetted speculation into inflated equities (and
condoned by the Clinton and Bush Administrations) failed to reverse the long downturn, and
at best, resulted in some short-term reversals of indicators. It has additionally created a
turbulent and more uncertain climate for corporations and especially financiers, who in the
recent subprime catastrophe, have reported enormous losses that call into question whether
speculative rallies like those of the late-1990s or mid-2000s will be possible in the near-term.
On the other hand, these fluctuations have exacted their gravest toll not on the American
ruling class, whose members possess more than enough assets to withstand any systematic
shocks, but those in the weakest social positions whose homes, incomes, and benefits have
gone first as these speculative runs fizzle out. And looking to the long term, a stagnant or
violently sputtering capitalism is still capitalism. So long as it can reproduce itself, in
however quantitatively weak and struggling form, it is unclear whether there is any optimism
for leftists in Boom, especially in the absence of any coherent left alternative with a basis in
39
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mass movement politics. Moreover, although speculative fever in the near-term will likely
dampen, this does not necessarily mean we will never see similar rapid boom-bubble cycles
after some time has elapsed, albeit a considerable amount of it. Ten years ago, in his classic
Wall Street, Doug Henwood quoted the economist Joseph Schumpeter, writing in 1939, as
follows, suggesting that volatility induced by speculation was in fact intrinsic to modern
finance:
It is one of the most characteristic features of the financial side of capitalist evolution
so to ‘mobilize’ all, even the longest, maturities as to make any commitment to a
promise of future balances amenable to being in turn financed by any sort of funds and
especially by funds available for short time, even overnight, only. This is not mere
technique. This is part of the core of the capitalist process. 41
More recently, in an article on the real estate meltdown, Henwood notes that
“according to a review by Lehman Brothers, there have been more than 60 major financial
crises over the last 400 years, half of them since 1900,” though the current turbulence is
clearly of another quantitative and qualitative class. 42 It still remains hard to tell what the
appropriate metaphor is: the roller coaster about to derail or the rubber band – one that
fluctuates increasingly wildly and that causes great strain to all those unfortunate enough to be
on its edges but that ultimately endures.
In the face of this, the strategic payoff to Brenner, then, is somewhat unclear and
surprisingly so. It is obviously unfair to fault Brenner, of course, for focusing mostly on
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economic structures alone, especially given the path-breaking nature of this project and its
already enormous scope. At the same time, the lack of much sustained commentary on
political strategy represents a peculiar omission for Brenner, who has long served as a leading
member and theoretician of the Solidarity political formation and helps edit its superb organ,
Against the Current, which provides regular excellent analysis of labor and social movements.
Moreover, conceptualizing the problem of the post-WWII economy as a story of decline (if
not all-out “crisis”) practically begs the “What next?” strategic questions, even if we do not
know the outcome of the events, but Brenner provides no direct answers here. A forthcoming
co-edited volume on the brief but militant labor upsurge in 1970s America – the onset of the
long downturn -- will likely offer much on social movement strategy amidst economic
transformation. Still, Brenner’s project remains an essential starting point for economic
historians and serious leftists inside and outside the academy, who should work to further
extrapolate its political implications. It is a hallmark contribution to post-WWII history.
***
David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism begins with a definition of a term
too often thrown around without any precision as to exactly what program it refers to or when
it began. In Harvey’s words, neo-liberalism is
in the first instance a theory of political-economic practices that proposes that human
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an
institutional framework appropriate to such practices… but beyond these tasks the
state should not venture. 43
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At first glance, one wonders whether the above actually warrants the use of a new term. As
both theory and practice, this definition sounds like most 19th-century western political
economy, aspects of which have always been part of American economic practice. The past
20 years certainly have many historical antecedents, but Harvey also suggests that they
contain much that is substantively new. “Neo-liberalism,” he contends, also provides
temporal specificity. What had developed by the 1990s represents a sharp disjuncture from
mid-century capbitalist development, with the turning point coming in the mid-to-late 1970s.
Harvey divides his book up into three parts. In a departure from Brenner, Harvey’s
first section analyzes neo-liberalism not just within the economic domain but also as a cultural
and ideological system. The second and most impressive of the sections provides a
depressing tour of the real-world transformations that have occurred across the world and for
which neo-liberal ideology provides cover. Harvey closes by identifying the cracks in neoliberal practice that have recently appeared while trenchantly criticizing the limitations of
existing oppositional movements to them. Even if one rejects some of its central claims, this
is an essential primer for understanding the past 30 years and an interplay among politics,
economics, and ideology largely unaddressed by Brenner’s volume.
Harvey opens by discussing the breakdown of mid-century Keynesianism, a collapse
that provided the space for neo-liberal programs to take hold. Harvey is not as explicit as
Brenner in identifying a single longitudinal mechanism behind the transition. But he, too,
identifies the 1960s and early 1970s as the onset of Keynesian slowdown, then breakdown, as
reflected by rising inflation, unemployment, stagnating GDP growth, and the collapse of the
Bretton-Woods currency exchange system, one of the key sources of global economic
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stability in the immediate post-WWII period. 44 Brief provides a compact, if oversimplified,
genealogy of neo-liberal ideology, pinpointing its roots to 1947, the year of the first meeting
of the Mont Pelerin Society, which counted Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman as
members. Even from these first days, neo-liberalism has never been theoretically coherent. It
instead grabbed bits and pieces from late 19th-century anti-Marxist political economy, Adam
Smith, philosophical treatises on various individual rights, and contract theory-based defenses
of the state to intervene to protect private property and markets (in spite of an overall
professed anti-state thrust). 45
How did a marginal ideology become dominant by the end of the century? Harvey
offers a number of explanations, some convincing, some not. Institutionally, neo-liberal
ideologues entrenched themselves in economics departments, especially at the University of
Chicago. They established posts at well-funded thinktanks like the American Enterprise
Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs. These institutional bases allowed them to
establish critical direct contacts with politicians open to embracing their ideas and who
eventually implemented them into policy. But here is where Harvey, like Brenner, differs
from liberal accounts of the New Right, which tend to identify the latter’s superior resource
and collective mobilization to explain ascendance. These are not necessarily wrong, per se,
but they do not adequately question whether this success would have been possible without
the mid-1970s structural breakdown of post-WWII Keynesianism. For Harvey, that moment
gave neo-liberalism the opportunity to move to the forefront, with the new regimes of United
Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, United States President Ronald Reagan, and
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker translating aspects of the new ideology into practice.
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Thatcher and Reagan both swiftly implemented programs of reduced taxes,
privatization of social services (especially Thatcher), anti-unionism, de-regulation, and
incentives for business. But for Harvey, the actions of the Carter-appointed, Reaganreapproved Volcker epitomized and launched what would become a hallmark of governance:
imposed and harsh fiscal austerity and sharp contraction of state economic aid. In 1979,
Volcker “engineered a draconian shift in US monetary policy” in response to rapid inflation,
raising the real rate of interest almost overnight from the negative range to around 8-9% a few
years later. The resulting intentional recession diminished consumer purchasing power and
furthered wage stagnation, scaring organized labor, while causing global reverberations that
culminated in the dramatic 1982 default of Mexico, no longer able to rely on credit from the
United States. The Mexican debt crisis, in turn, radically changed the direction of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the world’s other major international
lending agency. Both phased out Keynesian aspects of their operations in favor of what have
become known as structural adjustment programs (SAP). Under SAPs, potential borrowers
only received relief if they conformed to harsh IMF or WB-enforced reorganization of
administrative and economic policy, almost always tailored towards creating less regulated
business climates for foreign investments. They were to reduce the reach of labor law and
ensured as little overall state constraint on market behavior as possible – even as SAP
provisions were enforced by agencies funded by the world’s most powerful nation-states.
Domestically within the United States, Britain, and increasing parts of Europe and
East Asia (especially China), the policy changes of the early Thatcher and Reagan years
accelerated. In the United States, corporate taxes tumbled from 70% to 28%. Meanwhile, in
part due to ongoing fiscal deregulation, an unprecedented number of corporations (including
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manufacturers), through an ever elaborate and international set of fiscal instruments,
attempted to derive revenue from returns on speculative investment. For Harvey, this
tendency, beginning in the 1980s and culminating in the events described in the denouement
of the Brenner account, has resulted in a restructuring altogether of global class structure and
the emergence of a new financier class. 46
The late 1970s and early 1980s are critical years for Harvey. He spends far more time
on them than Brenner does in Boom, in which Volcker makes but a couple cameo
appearances. For Brenner, the key turning points stem first from inherent contradictions in
the mode of production (o-c/o-p) of the immediate post-WWII years and the stagnation that
they caused at the onset of the “long downturn” in 1973. For Harvey, the story is about much
more than economics, and he sees these years as nothing short of an ideological revolution
coming about at an opportune moment. But how has it continued to endure long after the
mid-1970s Keynesian collapse? Why have Democrats and Labour, the so-called parties of
opposition, until the past year, more or less increasingly absorbed the program over the past
two decades?
Harvey offers two sets of overlapping explanations for neo-liberal entrenchment in the
United States and in Britain. Some are more convincing than others. He argues that an
increasing shift from force to hegemony occurred from the 1970s onward. A brilliant section
juxtaposes the 1973 US-backed overthrow of democratically elected Chilean socialist
President Salvador Allende with the 1975 urban austerity regime imposed by a consortium of
financiers on a bankrupt New York City. But such big stick approaches, Harvey argues,

46

Ibid., 23-26, 29, 31-36. The Volcker shock may seem part of an altogether different program than that of
Greenspan’s rate cuts. But such an assessment is an ahistorical one that assesses the rate changes in a historical
vacuum. As I discuss later, when viewed within their contexts, the Volcker and Greenspan policies in fact do
not appear as contradictory as they seem initially.

Chowkwanyun 30
could not persist and gave way to what he calls “the construction of consent.” In the United
States, that took place with continued neo-liberal inroads into politically influential
institutions – not just ideologically compatible thinktanks but also universities, economic
departments, popular culture, and purportedly value-free groups like the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), which Harvey points out receives almost half its budget from
Fortune 500 companies. Two other American explanations are less fleshed out (and more
cultural than institutional), though one is more persuasive than the other and bound to cause
some controversy. It points to certain social libertarian strands within certain 1960s social
movements that if extended further enough are utterly compatible with neo-liberalism. As
Harvey puts it: “Neo-liberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual
freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and
eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice
through the conquest of state power.” 47 He adds further, in a passage that seems reminiscent
of Tom Frank’s earlier work:
By capturing ideals of individual freedom and turning them against the interventionist
and regulatory practices of the state, capitalist class interests could hope to protect and
even restore their position. Neo-liberalism was well suited to this ideological task.
But it had to be backed up by a practical strategy that emphasized the liberty of
consumer choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to
lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural practices. 48
One might say the same, too, about less thoughtful strains of self-styled “anarchism” and
“autonomism” that have arisen in the wake of the 1999 Seattle process, and whose antistatism sometimes ironically seems to rival that of the neo-liberals. Harvey has developed the
theme of unlikely ideological convergence more extensively in his Condition of Post-
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Modernity, but there and here, the explanation seems like it can only go so far in explaining
the reproduction in day-to-day life of an individualistic ethic.
Harvey’s other explanation is less convincing and also unoriginal. Taking an
unfortunate page from Thomas Edsall, Harvey argues that ideologues of the Republican Party
fomented a white, working class backlash that resulted in this group’s subordinating its “class
interests” to “cultural nationalism” and a “besieged sense of moral righteousness.” Frank has
issued a more recent variant of this argument in his What’s the Matter with Kansas?, but the
political scientist Larry Bartels, in a recent analysis of National Election Studies (NES) data,
concludes that Frank’s book rests on shaky ground, and that the group of which Frank writes
has not allowed cultural issues to “trump” economic ones. Rather, Bartels concludes that
there is no zero-sum association between the two, and that in the last couple decades of
voting, the white working-class has attached far less importance to cultural issues than have
its more affluent white counterparts, contrary to the exaggerated Frank and Edsall accounts. 49
Because of this argument, others may inadvertently group Harvey with a chorus of
reactionary liberal (and some left) voices who in recent years have argued that the embrace of
justice and protection for women and minorities (racial and sexual) by center-to-left voices
has undermined their political standing and should be rethought. 50 The most prominent of
these voices includes Edsall and his seeming disciple, Eric Alterman, who has repeatedly
denounced those who advocate for such issues and has most recently cheered the United
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States Supreme Court’s decision against affirmative action in public schools. 51 One expects
more from a mind like David Harvey’s.
Harvey’s account of the transition to neo-liberal hegemony in Britain is more
convincing. He portrays Thatcherism as a tale of the English bourgeoisie’s triumph over the
working class and situates it, as he does the advent of neo-liberalism more generally, within
the Keynesian crisis that exerted particularly pronounced effects on England. After the
Labour Government of the mid-1970s accepted an IMF loan and agreed to budgetary
restraints, a stagnant economy and rising inflation that devaluated the assets of individuals
and corporations still persisted. That paved the way for Thatcher to justify her neo-liberal
austerity program of anti-union activity, high interest rates, and an opening of British borders
to a flood of foreign investor interests. Her successful suppression of government workers’
strikes, reduction of their overall bargaining power, and the decline of inflation, Harvey
argues, “built middle-class consent for her politics in the process.” Harvey’s extended
analysis of Thatcher’s privatization of public housing also demonstrates a method by which
Thatcher incorporated the British bourgeois classes into her neo-liberal program. This
occurred alongside a broader overall shift that Harvey summarizes as follows:
Thatcher forged consent through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys
of home ownership, private property, individualism, and the liberation of
entrepreneurial opportunities. With working-class solidarities waning under pressure
and job structures radically changing through deindustrialization, middle-class values
spread more widely to encompass many of those who had once had a firm workingclass identity. 52
Although there existed limits to both Reagan and Thatcher’s initiatives, Harvey argues that
they sufficiently altered policy contours in both countries enough so that when Clinton and
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Blair each took office, “both Clinton and Blair found themselves in a situation where their
room for maneuver was so limited that they could not help but sustain the process of
restoration of class power even against their own better instincts,” an assessment perhaps too
generous to both but reflected in their respective records, one of which will be discussed more
closely later.
One closes Harvey’s first section wondering whether “consent” is the right framework
to view the advent of neo-liberalism. Harvey exaggerates and pushes too readily what might
be called the Gramsci Button. An alternate analysis might see it less as hegemonic triumph
than the pummeling into resignation and apathy of working-class political power. Further
research into working-class political demobilization and the reasons behind it – along with the
relationship between neo-liberal ideology and union decline – can answer this question. But
if anything, outcomes of the 2006 and 2008 elections suggest much more erratic and less
predictably patterned voting than Harvey’s interpretation suggests.
***
Having sketched neo-liberalism’s origins, Harvey proceeds to examine its practice in
subsequent years. He begins with a very valuable section that highlights what he calls the
“neo-liberal state’s” numerous internal contradictions and frictions. Its proponents profess the
virtues of minimizing the state, even as they invoke its powers, often in brutal ways, to create
“free markets.” They attempt to advocate its benefits for all, even though its policies often
exacerbate inequalities or extract tolls on large populations. It must maintain political
stability, even as an increasing number of people suffer economically under it. It invokes
frequently the virtues of individualism, even though its measures have often been extremely
authoritarian and coercive. It promotes competition, even though the policies have led to
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more combinations, buyouts, mergers, conglomerates, and less overall heterogeneity in many
sectors. 53 And so forth.
After outlining these contradictions, Harvey proceeds with two tour-de-force chapters
on the global landscape of neo-liberalism. The focus differs from that of Brenner, who even
in his account of the 1997 East Asian crisis, tends to focus more on preceding causes rather
than fallout and rubble left behind. By contrast, the image in Harvey’s account is of rapacious
financier cowboys and cowgirls wreaking fiscal havoc on much of the developing world with
state-backed apparatuses (principally the IMF and WB) doing much of their dirty bidding
while leaving a series of financial earthquakes in their wake. He identifies four underpinnings
of this new fiscal climate:
1. the acceleration of “financialization” through more foreign direct investment (FDI)
around the world.
2. reduced barriers to capital flow due to new innovations in transport and
communication and the reduction of many statutory protections on certain markets
3. the rise of a “Wall Street-IMF-Treasury complex” during the Clinton regime that
enforced strict loan and bilateral trade agreements to impose neo-liberal practices
on developing nations.
4. a growing acceptance in powerful institutions, in academia, government, agencies,
and elsewhere, of neo-liberalism’s key professed tenets. 54
In the neo-liberal era, Harvey writes, crises have been “both endemic and
contagious.” 55 The general dynamic is as follows. Investors flood a newly opened market,
create credit booms, and then pull out when the economic climate stagnates or even collapses
(for whatever reason), thus exacerbating the problem. The IMF or World Bank then offers a
loan under a SAP, which often includes the devaluation and reselling of extremely cheap
assets to the very same investors who worsened the crisis. The newest players in this, Harvey
notes, are giant hedge funds that have made predicting economic hardship, pullouts, and the
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acquisition of devalued assets central parts of their strategies. In almost all these cases, the
fallout also extends far beyond the original territory in question and affects other countries
that depend on it economically in some way. 56
In practice, this cycle does not occur without potential contradiction, and there exist
signs that political resistance to it may develop further down the line. Harvey’s case studies
of the Mexican and Argentinean experiences are instructive. In the late 1970s, early 1980s,
Mexico borrowed billions from New York banks willing to bet on future Mexican oil profits,
which failed to materialize after the Volcker shock lowered oil demand in the United States.
After “massive capital flight” and declaration of bankruptcy in 1982, Mexico agreed to World
Bank relief in 1984 that imposed a severe SAP program with budgetary restrictions,
reductions in social services, and massive privatization. Individual economic indicators –
wages, income, and others – declined rapidly, though privatization and FDI expanded,
especially with so many cheap assets up for grabs. These trends accelerated in 1989, when
Mexico accepted partial debt relief from the IMF for agreement to additional neo-liberal
provisions. In 1991, President Carlos Salinas passed a radical law allowing privatization of
indigenous lands, previously protected by the 1917 Constitution. The Salinas edict spawned
the peasant rebellion that has become known as the Zapatista movement, though it is unclear
the extent to which the Zapatistas can move politically beyond pockets of successful
resistance and disruptions at the local level. In 1995, internal inequality grew further when
another debt crisis caused by speculative dollar-dominated runs on the peso and subsequent
devaluation caused a default a dollar-denominated debt. The devaluation and default allowed
more foreign capital to acquire newly cheap assets. Harvey reports the astonishing figure
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that, by 2000, 24 out of 30 private Mexican banks were foreign owned (compared to one in
1990). Meanwhile, general capital flight to even more hospitable countries like China has
resulted in enormous hardship that co-exists alongside an enormous top-heavy wealth
structure. 57
It remains to be seen whether this growing inequality can translate into more political
mobilization against both a Mexican national bourgeoisie and elite that has profited from
privatization and the external lending agencies. Argentina provides an interesting countercase. Its 1995 debt, caused by Mexico, “soared to $9.5 billion” on interest alone within five
years and resulted in a $6 billion IMF loan that failed to curb capital flight and ended in
default. Argentinean Eduardo Duhalde implemented severe austerity programs of his own,
including restrictions on bank withdrawals, freezes on saving accounts, and most
significantly, devaluations of the peso, all of which led to public outcry in the form of blocked
traffic, rioting, and factory takeovers. But this pressure appears to have influenced newly
elected President Nestor Kirchner, who “could only snub the IMF, default on $88 billion in
debts, and initially offer to pay off outraged creditors at the rate of 25 cents on the dollar.” 58
As Harvey writes, Kirchner’s economic advisers “take the ‘heterodox’ view that while the
repayment of the external debt is important it should not entail a collapse of living standards
in Argentina.” 59
In fact, there are signs, as the sociologist Walden Bello has recently noted, of a “crisis
of legitimacy” for the lending agencies, who have been rebuffed by a host of East Asian and
Latin American countries in the past few years, including Thailand, China, and Venezuela,
that simply want to pay off all remaining debts and have nothing to do with the agency
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again. 60 Whether this momentum continues and threatens the apparatus that Harvey describes
will be an important development to watch.
***
Besides paying more attention to the lending agencies and the protracted consequences
of financial turbulence than does Brenner, Harvey also analyzes the emerging role of China in
far more depth. Brief History contains one of the most compact and useful English-language
surveys of China to date. 61 The China he depicts is rapidly becoming a global fulcrum, but
Harvey argues that this should not come as a surprise and that China has been as much a part
of the neo-liberal sweep since its onset in the late 1970s. Harvey dates “neo-liberalism ‘with
Chinese characteristics,’” a play on the Chinese Communist Party’s official theory of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” to the post-Mao Zedong leadership of Deng
Xiaopang, who in 1978 initiated a series of economic reforms that have resulted in a new mix
of authoritarianism, collectivism, and capitalism. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) competed
among themselves, and prices now moved according to market forces. Foreign investment
and trade were allowed, though in an extremely rigid way overseen by the CCP. This “statemanipulated market economy” has only accelerated since then. SOEs now exist alongside
“township and village enterprises,” (TVEs) both of which have attracted increasing foreign
capital. 62
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The biggest transformation has been geographic. Although peasants benefited in the
initial short-term from the eventual abolition of communal lands that enabled them to lease
out and collect rent on their allotted portions, the basic social safety net associated with the
communes has now morphed into one that charges fees for services. Peasant migration to
urban areas has consequentially accelerated at an astonishing rate. More than 100 million
migrant workers have moved so far while living under extreme poverty and insecurity. Rural
decline, the urban-rural divide, and “the instability it is generating is today one of the most
serious problems facing the Chinese government,” Harvey concludes. 63
These developments also carry two global ramifications. China has committed an
enormous amount of money to urban physical infrastructure, including massive investment in
roads, public transportation, buildings, highways. This has led to a very healthy export
market for many countries abroad. On the other hand, if this quasi-Keynesian program stops
or slow, it can result in serious reverberations for those who increasingly rely on the China
market. Moreover, if China is prematurely betting on its own growth, it will find itself left
with an enormous amount of redundant fixed capital – a version of Brenner’s o-c/o-p problem
-- which could lead to further stagnation and a slowdown or reversal of these recent trends. 64
The other major development of global consequence is the degree of Chinese
investment overseas, particularly in United States treasury bills that allow it to undercut
American competition and ensure access to the American market because of a low yuan. It
continues to fund needed American debts (especially with the ongoing military intervention).
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Chinese divestment, though not foreseeable soon, could have catastrophic effects, especially
if China succeeds in developing an autonomous regional economy in East Asia. 65
Whether the increasing economic inequality leads to more social unrest is unclear.
The 1989 events of Tiananmen Square have led the CCP to shrewdly relax many of its social
restrictions. An emerging intellectual movement that some have dubbed the “Chinese New
Left” publishes in Western journals and lectures at universities abroad, openly criticizing
Chinese neo-liberalization, but this is obviously a more manageable form of dissent than a
mass popular movement. 66 Seeds for that may exist in the massive return migration back to
rural China as urban construction projects and enterprises are put on hold because of recent
events. 67 Harvey might have included the parallel story in parts of the Middle East, too,
particularly the United Arab Emirates, which is also experiencing a boom economy that
depends heavily on extreme labor exploitation. 68 Both cases are “stay tuned” stories, but
whatever their outcomes, the consequences will have serious ramifications beyond national
boundaries.
***
Harvey’s stimulating book will provoke much debate not just on global politics and
the economy but also on oppositional strategy. Like Brenner, he begins this section by noting
the “nothing short of dismal” actual record of neo-liberalism, one that exists alongside a
hegemonic hold (at least among the governing elite). How does this happen? For Harvey, the
uneven geographical development of neo-liberalism – both within and among regions – has
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allowed those who have excelled to become the face of the project’s success while the
suffering of the majority has been ignored by neo-liberal boosters in popular and elite outlets.
But these images aside, the fiscal material returns have also declined from their immediate
post-WWII years. 69 Moreover, Harvey identifies contradictions – the questionable viability
of major state-backed lending agencies, new emerging powers, the increasing economic
vulnerability of older ones, especially due to debt, growing global inequality, and others – that
may threaten or at least destabilize the future of the neo-liberal project. 70 But any crisis in the
system, he argues, holds two possible two consequences. In the first, an elite simply allows
the crisis to happen and leaves the bulk of the suffering to those in the lower strata. In the
second, the crisis’s impact is lessened or even avoided by a movement that “is in a better
position to redeem capitalism than is capitalist class power itself.” 71 Harvey does not rule out
the possibility of long-term transformation, but unlike many of the prior crisis theorists, also
does not see the current set of contradictions leading to anything but an even more inefficient
neo-liberalism or catastrophe (but not collapse).
What would the sort of movement, reformist as it might initially be, look like? Harvey
surveys the present landscape, and as with much left writing, the critique is accurately
withering and better than the positive program, which he leaves to readers to articulate. Much
of the section is a warning against movements that reproduce neo-liberal logic themselves.
He writes of the limitations of what Tariq Ali elsewhere has called the “human rights
industry,” properly noting that groups and campaigners within it mainly fight to protect civil
and political rights but not economic ones that would require steps towards broader social
organization. Even those that do, Harvey argues, cannot transcend the “two dominant logics
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of power” of capital and of state, neither of which seems particularly compelled these days to
give into demands that cut against their imperatives. When they do, it is almost solely in
recast neo-liberal terms – for example, the recent rise of “carbon credits” scheme in response
to global warming. 72 The recent proliferation of benign-sounding non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that fill roles previously played by the state before the advent of neoliberalism end up reinforcing it. It is difficult to read Harvey and come away with much faith
in the catalytic ability of top-down, organizational apparatuses staffed by elite and bourgeois
saviors looking out for the rest of the world. 73
What, then, does Harvey make of the more organic and grassroots movements that
have arisen in recent years? He seems at turns heartened by them, especially the mobilization
around the lending agencies, and disappointed by their atomization and limited vision. On the
latter point, he alternately praises and criticizes the Zapatistas, for example, over their
eschewing of state power (both programmatically and ideologically) and their instead
“work[ing] through the whole of civil society n a more open and fluid search for alternatives
that would look to the specific needs of the different social groups and allow them to improve
their lot.” 74 On atomization, he notes an array of groups advocating for single constituencies
and single causes, whether reform in land policy, lending agency practice, or environmental
regulation, but stresses “finding the organic link between these different movements.” For
Harvey, this missing link is a return to attacking the wide-ranging and dispersed influence of
capital rather than seeing class struggle as just another isolated cause (or, worse, something
requiring a zero-sum tradeoff with other causes, as both “colorblind” liberal and narrow
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identitarian strains of political thought would have it). As he puts it, in his most specific
programmatic formulation: “The first lesson we must learn, therefore, is that if it looks like
class struggle and acts like class war then we have to name it unashamedly for what it is. The
mass of the population has either to resign itself to the historical and geographical trajectory
defined by overwhelming and ever-increasing upper-class power, or respond to it in class
terms.” 75 But the task of translating this sentiment into action, while avoiding some of the
shortcomings Harvey identifies, is left to readers of this rewarding book. Just as a critical
opening in the Keynesian system allowed neo-liberal ideology and policy to emerge and fill a
vacuum, so too may growing fissures within neo-liberalism itself, however uncertain the
strategic catalysts.
***
The conclusion of Brief History suggests, as Immanuel Wallerstein has argued
forcefully for years (and to much ridicule until recently), that the United States’s political and
economic power are waning and that the upsurge in military power represents a final and
desperate attempt to reverse declining hegemony. 76 Harvey proposes that the neoconservative
militarism of the Bush years may represent a transitional phase from neo-liberalism, even if
until recently the latter was not threatening to collapse or to implode as dramatically as
Keynesianism did in the 1970s.
The New Imperialism develops this analysis in greater detail. Written in the run-up to
the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, it is an attempt “to penetrate beneath the surface flux
to divine some of the deeper currents in the making of the world’s historical geography that
might shed some light,” in Harvey’s words, “on why we have arrived at such a dangerous and
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difficult conjuncture.” 77 Written in more theoretical language than Brief History, The New
Imperialism reads like a collection of extended provocations, questions, and reformulations,
and its goal is less about constructing a thorough genealogy to the present than to provide
useful frames and categories for sorting through rapidly unfolding events. On this score, the
book succeeds, incorporating an important dimension of power – the military – neglected by
Brenner. Those who have found Harvey’s other works useful but sometimes overly abstract
will recognize many concepts from them applied fruitfully to actual circumstances.
At the outset, Harvey identifies a “double dialectic” driving the new “capitalist
imperialism,” defined as “a contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire’… and the
molecular process in space and time in which command over and use of capital takes
primacy.” 78 He labels these the 1) “territorial and capitalist logics of power” and the 2) “inner
and outer relations of the capitalist state.” In simpler terms, the first refers to the classic
tension between the imperatives of the state (particularly geopolitical/spatial) and those of
capital – how they sometimes enforce each other, are in tension, outright diverge, or any
number of other situations. The second refers to the relationship between actions within a
nation-state and those outside its boundaries. He might have added a third – a constant
tension between force and consent as means of exerting power.
Harvey’s first two chapters concentrate on the first theme. Harvey uses Middle
Eastern oil as a case study of how state and capital’s goals intertwine. In the run up to the
war, slogans like “No Blood for Oil” became commonplace, but they obscured as much as
they edified. Did they mean that the war simply amounted to capital (oil companies) using
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the state as a conduit to secure future fields for private expropriation? If so, that has certainly
not occurred yet, as demonstrated by persistently high American oil prices and the exclusion
of the fields from an overall privatization program implemented during the reconstruction.
And furthermore, why now? Harvey seeks more than just an economic explanation. While
he hardly discounts the possibility of a future boon for private companies, he argues that
broader geopolitical aims drove the invasion, with oil serving as the “key economic resource”
that a global power must control if it is to maintain political power in at least the region. 79
Blood appears to have been shed for oil, but in the short term, less apparently for private
capital than for the interests of the state. Harvey stresses that
the relation between these two logics [territory and state] should be seen, therefore, as
problematic and often contradictory (that is, dialectical) rather than as functional or
one-sided… The difficulty for concrete analyses of actual situations is to keep the two
sides of this dialectic simultaneously in motion and not to lapse into either a solely
political or a predominantly economic mode of argumentation. 80
He then divides the modern history of imperialism into three stages to show that the
nature of this dialectic is historically mediated. In the first, “the rise of bourgeois
imperialisms” from 1870-1945, mostly European nation-states simultaneously mobilized
nationalist and racist sentiment at home to support their search for markets abroad, where they
could render surplus capital productive. Overt use of force characterized this period, which
the interlinked events of WWI, global fiscal instability, and WWII brought to a close . For
Harvey, the logics of territory and of capital here mutually reinforced each other. In the
second period, from the end of WWII to 1970, that relationship became more complex as the
United States entered the immediate post-WWII years “as by far the most dominant power” in
the economic and military domains. But its geopolitical power and “imperial ambition,”
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Harvey argues, relied less on overt force than an “abstract universalism” and the creation of
“an open international order for trade and economic development” and international
consensus via accords and institutions like the Bretton Woods system, lending agencies, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 81 While state and capital were still intertwined, the
inner-outer dialectic had changed, and the United States mostly became a developmental state
that “did not rely too much on the extraction of value from the rest of the world,” as measured
by GDP. Its growth instead primarily depended on a Keynesian program that fueled domestic
spending. At the same time, of course, it did not hesitate to use occasional force abroad “to
protect client regimes throughout the world that were supportive of US interests” and to
overthrow those that appeared to threaten the international consensus it wanted to forge.
Eventually, this feature of the immediate Cold War years, on display most dramatically during
the Vietnam War, contributed to the phase’s end, along with growing competition (as Brenner
would also argue) and the general breakdown of Keynesianism. 82
Harvey dates the beginnings of “neo-liberal hegemony” to 1970 and explores its
general features in more depth in Brief History. In the post-1970 period, Harvey’s dialectics
have changed dramatically, with foreign outlets, according to this account, proving more and
more crucial to capital that has taken on an increasingly financialized, dispersed, and to use
his metaphor, “molecular” form. As we saw earlier in Brief, capital often acts independently
of the state but later relies on its powers (or those of agencies with its backing) at opportune
moments – for example, to call in defaulted loans via the imposition of a SAP that ends up
creating an even more fruitful speculative environment for it. Capital and the state have
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become less mutually constitutive than reliant (the former on the latter). By contrast, the
inner and outer have become increasingly close and intertwined. Neo-liberal ideology
professes consensus but in practice frequently relies on coercion. 83 The following table
summarizes these phases:

1870-1945
1945-1970

1970-

Territorial(state)Capital
Mutually reinforcing
Intertwined, less
expansive
geopolitically

State often
subordinate to
capital’s needs,
capital diffuse,
“molecular”

Inner-Outer

Consent-Coercion

Intertwined
Greater focus
on internal
development,
Keynesian
developmental
state
Heavily
intertwined

Coercion
Consent, occasional
coercion

Ideology of
consent, practice of
frequent coercion

While schematic, these phases are useful for turning “imperialism” from a monolithic
reification to historically specific term, even if what Harvey sees as the predominant
characteristics of each are obviously present (though in different ways) in the other time
periods.
***
The rest of the book examines the dynamics of this third phase more closely. Harvey
elaborates the concept of the “spatio-temporal fix” – the “particular kind of solution to
capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion.” 84 The crises he
identifies here are similar to Brenner’s – the problem of over-capacity (Harvey uses the term
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“over-accumulation.”) But Harvey additionally differentiates among three distinct “circuits”
of capital: primary, secondary, and tertiary and charges Brenner with only paying attention to
the first, “the realm of immediate production and consumption.” 85 Secondary circuits refer to
investments in “fixed capital for production (plant and equipment, power-generating capacity,
rail links, ports, etc.),” consumption funds, and institutions and “built environment(s) for
production and consumption (everything from industrial parks, ports and airports, transports
and communications nets to sewage and water systems, housing, hospitals, schools).” Finally,
Harvey defines tertiary circuits as “long-term investments in social infrastructures,” such as
research programs and social services. 86 Elsewhere, in Limits to Capital, he has written that
these latter two circuits are beset with contradictions. If they successfully result in more
surplus production, they contribute to overproduction. If they do not, they contribute to
devaluation and stagnation. 87 The New Imperialism argues that this more expansive, threepronged conceptualization of capital renders the o-c problem even more urgent and one more
likely to spark periodic crises. By contrast, he charges (accurately in my view) that Brenner
largely restricts his analysis to the consequence of over-production of commodities,
competition, and the mounting costs of retaining excess sunk productive capital. Indeed,
Brenner’s account remains almost exclusively focused on short-term policy fixes like the
Plaza and Reverse Plaza Accords, which opened up markets for the American and Japanese
commodities respectively -- but little on the spatio-temporal ones that allow for surplus capital
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to be “sent elsewhere to find a fresh terrain for their profitable realization if they are not to be
devalued.” 88
In Harvey’s view, spatio-temporal fixes are most manifest today in the practices of
global speculative finance capital, detailed in Brief. “The general picture which then
emerges,” he writes, “is of a networked spatio-temporal world of financial flows of surplus
capital with conglomerations of political and economic power at key nodal points (New York,
London, Tokyo) seeking either to disburse.” 89 But he goes further than most “globalization”
theorists in a stimulating chapter with historical and strategic claims that have already stirred
controversy. Borrowing heavily (while heavily revising) from Rosa Luxemburg, Harvey
contends that capitalists must constantly search for outlays for their excess capital, and when
they find them, impose their presence in often brutal ways. 90 In addition to Luxemburg,
Harvey reworks Marx’s own concept of primitive accumulation, elaborated in the closing
section of Capital, volume 1. Recently, primitive accumulation has attracted the attention of
leftists who believe that it may help elucidate the dynamics of present-day capitalism, and
Harvey is the latest of them. Is the use appropriate? And either way, are there actual
ramifications, or does this merely amount to terminological appropriation for the sake of it?
An examination of the concept in its original form is in order.
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In the “So-Called Primitive Accumulation,” Marx wrestled with a simple conundrum.
Where does the capital required for the modern mode of production, labor exploitation, and
accumulation come from in the first place? The answer: primitive accumulation, “an
accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of
departure.” It “plays approximately the same role in political economy as original sin does in
theology” and amounts to nothing short of “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short,
force...” 91 Force, Marx declares shortly afterwards, “is the midwife of every old society
which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.” 92
The rest of the analysis is divided into two sections. One emphasizes internal change,
with Marx analyzing the protracted enclosure of English land from communal lands to
“capitalist farmers” in the 15th through 17th centuries, its legal legitimation and codification,
the subsequent loss of self-sufficiency, and the creation of a new reserve army of “daylabourers and hirelings” who are ultimately separated from land and the ownership of the
means of production. Marx’s rhetoric is at its most polemical and corrosive here. He
summarizes the chapter entitled “The Expropriation of the Agricultural Population” as
follows:
The spoliation of the Church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the state domains,
the theft of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property and its
transformation into modern private property under circumstances of ruthless terrorism,
all these things were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation. They
conquered the field for capitalist agriculture, incorporated the soil into capital, and
created for the urban industries the necessary supplies of free and rightless
proletarians. 93
The second section on primitive accumulation shifts outside of the capitalist nation’s
boundaries. In this half, he surveys the various means in which plunder of non-capitalist
91
92

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (New York: Penguin Press, 1976 [1867]), 873.
Ibid., 916.

Chowkwanyun 50
countries aids accumulation of capital. Marx offers pages of examples, and at fleeting
moments, seems to argue for the centrality of this type of primitive accumulation to
capitalism’s birth and early perpetuation. In the most forthright passage, he writes:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and in
mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest
and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial
hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of
capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive
accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the European
nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. It begins with the revolt of the
Netherlands from Spain, assumes gigantic dimensions in England’s Anti-Jacobin War,
and is still going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China, etc. 94

Marx completes the section (and Capital, volume 1) with an overview of debt-fueled trade,
the emergence of joint-stock companies of global reach, and the use of colonial labor to
undercut the political power of workers both in the homeland and colonies abroad.
Although the primitive accumulation section possesses undeniable literary and
polemical force, Harvey and others have observed that it amounts to more of a “sketch” -- and
a sometimes inconsistent one at that -- rather than a logically tight elaboration of a concept.
As a result, writers have been able to take what they wanted to take from the section, and their
choices provide a Rorschach into their general analytical and political positions. Scholars like
Maurice Dobb, the early Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood have largely downplayed the
implications of the second half, instead focusing on the role of either internal class
differentiation or heightened class struggle in the transition to capitalism. 95 By contrast, those
on the other side of that debate, including activists and scholars influenced by (or in) Third
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World Marxism or dependence and world-systems theories, have argued that early capitalist
formulation must be seen as inextricably linked to exploitation beyond a nation’s borders and
the formation of a world market. 96 Harvey’s prior work places him in this latter category.
While passing phrases in Marx’s section seem to point explicitly to the latter
interpretation, they only occur in its second half, which follows a critical transitory section on
the development of a home market that fuels an industrial capitalism, which eventually seeks
new markets and labor outside of the home territory. It is less certain whether Marx argues
that plunder abroad is an absolutely necessary component of primitive accumulation (and
capitalist development more broadly) in all cases, a perpetual process requiring the existence
of “peripheral” territories for “core” powers to exploit regularly, or even both. But even with
these ambiguities, Harvey’s reworking manages to incorporate all these elements of the
concept: the signaling of a new phase in economic development, privatization of once
communal lands, the mass proletarization of once self-sufficient peoples, the role of extraterritorial expropriation, and its possible ongoing nature. “All the features of primitive
accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism’
historical geography up until now,” he writes. 97 To provide some historical specificity to the
concept, he renames it “accumulation by dispossession.”
What are the implications of this term? I see three. First, Harvey’s formulation
implies that we are moving into a new and distinct phase of capitalism, as “epoch making” a
transition as that Marx wrote of. Second, that phase is characterized by regular over-
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accumulation of primary, secondary, and tertiary capital, rapidly constructed and abandoned,
as investors survey the globe to identify new territories for making capital productive, while
fleeing old ones. And third, plunder, theft, and force – later sanctioned by the state – are
central to modern capital accumulation.
While the metaphoric power and appeal of the term may be obvious, what about its
actual appropriateness? On the last implication, the state-backed privatization of communal
lands in large sections of Latin America, Africa, and East Asia would initially seem to qualify
without question as primitive accumulation. But on the other hand, some of the extraterritorial exploitation that Harvey and others document, especially that involving the lending
agencies, occurs completely within the parameters of international law. A SAP, for example,
boils down in the end to a contract between two entities, a developing state and a lending
agency. Coercion and political pressure to sign may exist, obviously, but it is of a different
and more evolved from than the blunt, brutal, and simple practices described by Marx. Use
of the term obfuscates these fundamental differences.
Further, the Harvey reformulation and the notion of the spatio-temporal fix assign a
central, rather than secondary, role to foreign exploitation in ongoing capital accumulation.
But it is not clear that the return on foreign investment is yielding higher overall returns and
thereby playing so central a reinforcing role as some may think. Doug Henwood’s critique of
“globalization” theorists, whose work he calls “globaloney,” comes with empirical data
(below) that suggests the overall return on foreign investment, scattered dramatic cases aside
(some described above), is much lower than one would think from many of these accounts,
including Harvey’s.
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Actual Rates of Return on Foreign Investment in Henwood, After the New Economy, 156.

And as Harvey’s own aggregate figures in Brief History (and Brenner’s) indicate,
despite dramatic individual cases, neo-liberalism on a whole has not resulted in renewed
dynamism but enduring stagnation. 98 Harvey points, too, to the increasing internal
contradictions and political resistance to this program. Both cast doubt on claims that we are
entering a new stage of capitalism as opposed to simply witnessing a more unfettered
manifestation of it (that is, alas, not terribly good efficient). Moreover, it is unclear why
98
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many practices in the 19th-century would also not constitute “accumulation by dispossession,”
elastic as Harvey’s definition is, and if they did, whether the term would be diluted of any
usefulness. The analytical utility and descriptive precision of the reformulation thus seem
questionable to me. It raises interesting questions, but in the end, may not amount to a very
useful theoretical contribution because of all these ambiguities.
***
Whatever its shortcomings, the term nevertheless provides a useful launching pad for
Harvey’s critique of oppositional movements today, one much more trenchant and systematic
than that offered in Brief. The critiques in both books wrestle with the enduring leftist
problem of fragmentation. In The New Imperialism, Harvey uses the inner-outer dialectic, on
which “accumulation by dispossession” pivots, to identify two problems. The first concerns
what he sees as a historic separation of anti-capitalist movements from anti-imperialist
movements. If domestic labor wins concessions from capitalists who must increasingly rely
upon imperialist endeavors, then are these victories indirectly profiteering off the suffering of
other workers abroad? If so, do labor or anti-capitalist movements therefore have a duty to
incorporate an anti-imperialist politics? Harvey answers resoundingly: yes. He writes that
“the relation of internal struggles for social betterment of external displacements characteristic
of imperialism tended to be ignored (with the result that much of the labour movement in the
advanced capitalist countries fell into the trap of acting as an aristocracy of labour out to
preserve its own privileges, by imperialism if necessary).” This was a “fatal mistake,” he
argues, “for if the two forms of struggle are organically linked within the historical geography
of capitalism, then the left was not only disempowering itself but was also crippling its
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analytical and programmatic powers by totally ignoring one side of this duality.” 99 He directs
an equal level of criticism, however, towards anti-imperialist movements that lack an anticapitalist thrust. Even if successful, such movements may only result in the formation of
Third World national bourgeosies that behave in as exploitative a manner as their counterparts
in more economically dominant regions of the world. They may, too, successfully resist
capitalist encroachment but provide little in the way of redistribution of wealth, let alone
anything resembling socialism. 100
These are fruitful critiques. The latter on the limits of some Third World selfdetermination movements is particularly pressing today. One thinks of the devolution of
some post-colonial African regimes and debates over whether the recent political upheavals in
Latin America should be viewed as merely anti-imperialist (and a check to the United States)
versus all-out rejections of neo-liberal logic. I am less taken with Harvey’s critique of
domestic labor and his call for it to embrace an anti-imperialist program. What this would
actually entail in practice is highly unclear. But if something like Third World Marxism and
“New Communism” of the late 1960s and early 1970s are what Harvey has in mind,
apprehensiveness may be the right reaction. 101 Like that antecedent, an anti-imperialist and
anti-capitalist synthesis in the United States today will likely involve little more than vicarious
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flights of political fancy over Third World struggles that the American left or labor movement
have little to no impact over – beyond, that is, position papers and exchange trips by celebrity
leftists. Harvey’s critique also rests on the shaky assumption, as mentioned before, that
accumulation by dispossession plays a far more central role to capital accumulation today,
that it is “organically linked, dialectically intertwined,” a claim that his own Brief data (and
Henwood’s) calls into doubt. 102
These aspects of Harvey’s strategy analysis will not prove the most controversial,
however. That will come instead from an extended section in which Harvey raises the
prospect of a silver lining to accumulation by dispossession. The suggestion follows a
critique of movements that Harvey accuses of embracing a “politics of nostalgia.” These
movements run the gamut, but according to Harvey, they all harken back to pre-capitalist
ways of life – self-sufficiency, communalism -- and often exhibit a rabid suspicion towards
the state and its possible role in redistributive economic planning. They may oppose capitalist
encroachment, in other words, but are hardly socialist. Rather, they seem to owe more to the
anarchist political tradition and place a high value on decentralization. For them, “the answer
lies,” as Harvey accurately puts it, “… in localization of everything.” These formations often
“dismiss the union movement as a closed modernist, reactionary, and oppressive form of
organization that needs to be superseded by the more fluid and open postmodern forms of
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social movement.” 103 The result is a left that focuses on the narrow and the particular and is
thus far less likely to form a mass movement. 104
For Harvey, movements that embrace this politics are also woefully misguided about
the long run. Marx believed, Harvey claims, that primitive accumulation signaled the
beginning of a somewhat irreversible process. In the short run, it brought devastation and
upheaval, but attempts to cling onto the past were futile and also ignored the possible benefits
that more “modernized” modes of production might bring under political systems that
distributed their control in an egalitarian manner. Harvey makes this argument in passages
like the following:
Marx (as opposed to anarchists such as Reclus and Kropotkin, and adherents of the
William Morris branch of socialism) placed little if any value on the social forms
destroyed by primitive accumulation. Nor did he argue for a perpetuation of the status
quo and most certainly not for any reversion to pre-capitalist social relations and
productive forms. He took the view that there was something progressive about
capitalist development and that this was true even for British imperialism in India… 105

“It was, within the Marxist/communist revolutionary tradition,” he continues, “often deemed
necessary to organize the equivalent of primitive accumulation in order to implement
programmes of modernization in those countries that had not gone through the initiation into
capitalist development.” 106 He acknowledges (though rather quickly) the horrors of Chinese
and Soviet collectivization programs before arriving at a conclusion designed to provoke. For
Harvey, political movements of today “must rise above nostalgia for that which has been lost
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and likewise be prepared to recognize the positive gains to be had from the transfers of assets
that can be achieved through limited forms of dispossession…” He adds that
they must likewise seek to discriminate between progressive and regressive aspects of
accumulation by dispossession and seek to guide the former towards a more
generalized political goal that has more universal valency than the many local
movements, which often refuse to abandon their own particularity.107

In his conclusion, Harvey softens his point slightly by (vaguely) stating that “ways must be
found” to mediate between what he paints as the inevitable thrust of capitalist development
and the “traces of history and tradition that arise from the ways in which they made
themselves in response” to such incursions. 108 But the overall message is still resounding and
will inflame many readers. Put simply, it is that any viable long-term anti-capitalist
movement must take capitalism’s global reach as a starting point and shun attempts to
reconstruct pre-capitalist ways of social organization. One reading might even hold that
though they will get hurt in the process, some will have to serve as sacrificial lambs in those
territories where the required transition to capitalism remains. Harvey might view attempts to
fight dam construction in India or the new anarchist localism in the United States of the past
ten years (to take just two examples) as both futile in the long run and politically shortsighted. These movements, after all, reject more efficient capitalist modes of production and
also the useful functions that only modern state planning can provide. This analysis is
consistent with Harvey’s view that accumulation by dispossession not only describes
processes (e.g. the brute appropriation of land) but also signals an irreversible new epoch for
those who have not been subsumed into capitalist relations already.
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Many readers, including this one, will reject this argument as a mechanical,
teleological, and crudely “stagist” reading of Marx, one that has Harvey arguing for a near
complete transition to global capitalism before the prospect of socialism can occur. 109
Despite Harvey’s rejection of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s recent writings on the
emancipatory potential of global, integrated capitalism, his critique shares some common
ground with them by posing it as a starting point. (The difference, of course, is that Hardt and
Negri repudiate, as Harvey forcefully does not, a strong role for seizure of state apparatuses
and posit a chain reaction of bottom-up uprisings instead.) But these theoretical issues, I
think, are not the primary point. If the passage generates some reflexivity among activists
today, then it will have provided a much-needed service, regardless of how much readers
accept the propositions. Up until now, too much recent analysis of activism simply celebrates
anything and everything that passes itself off as "resistance” instead of identifying and
scrutinizing the very different and contradictory political strains within these emerging
movements. Some of these groups espouse a rabidly anti-technological, primitivist, and
autarkic politics that would likely bother most leftists if they bothered to pay attention to these
differences instead of cheerlead. 110 Others, particularly abroad (like the Zapatistas), have
won sporadic local victories, but their rejection of state power has limited their reach and
called into question the longevity of their gains. Despite the intentionally inflammatory
claims, Harvey has offered the left a useful rubric for self-evaluation, and its members would
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be foolish not to work through it. For younger radicals especially, The New Imperialism also
underscores the pressing need to revisit the enduring debate between Marxism and anarchism
(and all those in between) and to engage respectfully with the best of the latter. 111
***
More than 25 years ago, Harvey concluded Limits to Capital on a terrifying note,
declaring that there was “no ‘spatial fix’ that can contain the contradictions of capitalism in
the long run.” The world might instead enter an age of “inter-imperialist rivalries” in which
perpetual investment in weaponry (and usage) would provide an outlay for surplus capital. 112
The New Imperialism revisits this possibility and ends full circle with the book’s opening
problem of identifying the long-term forces behind the Bush era’s military endeavors.
Harvey’s unpacking of the problem here amounts to more of a general picture, which
given the rapid pace of developments in the past few years, is probably for the better. Still,
Harvey asserts that a transition is occurring, away from the neo-liberal processes analyzed in
both books. “Even before the events of 9/11,” he writes, “it was clear that neo-liberal
imperialism was weakening on the inside, that even the asset values on Wall Street could not
be protected, and that the days of neo-liberalism and its specific forms of imperialism were
numbered.” 113 What may gradually replace – or at least co-exist alongside it – is an age of
neo-conservatism with a United States that compensates for diminishing economic power
with military conquest. The exact role of these military forays in capital accumulation is not
always direct, and the ambiguity between the logic of territory and that of capital is a tension
110
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that has always existed in Harvey’s work. Although most of the analysis in Limits
conceptualized imperialism as a series of spatio-temporal fixes for surplus capital, Harvey
acknowledged (albeit briefly and fleetingly) that not all “periodic violent confrontations
between nations and regions” could be subsumed to an economic explanation. 114 Likewise,
here Harvey allows even more room for alternative explanation by suggesting that the Iraq
invasion and the neo-conservative project may be fueled as much by ideological “Pax
Americana” conviction and a desire for geopolitical control as new sinks for capital. He
points accurately, too, to the recent spike in religious rhetoric and diminished civil liberties
and draws an important connection between domestic repression and foreign endeavors,
though does not specify exactly which exists first and causes the other. 115 The overall
analysis of the dynamic among nationalism (and the politics of culture more generally),
imperialism, and capital accumulation remain underdeveloped throughout the book and its
conclusion.
The inter-imperialist rivalry depicted at the close of Limits may well arrive, however,
but with more complex roots than simply capital’s perpetual drive to accumulate. The nascent
regional blocs in Latin America, East Asia, and the Middle East may prove a major source of
friction, especially China. Its favorable trade and currency imbalances with the United States
increase each year, strengthening its export economy in the process, all while it funds a
mounting American foreign debt. If China succeeds in forming its own regional export
market, thereby lessening its dependence on the United States, its political and economic
autonomy would only increase further, though the current moment may render such
predictions premature. Harvey advances the very real possibility, too, of an eventual drive for
113
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political and economic control of Caspian Basin oilfields between the United States and
China. Similar, though less dramatically successful, developments are coming from other
regions. There is also, as Brief notes, an increasing resistance to the United States-backed
lending agencies critical to the foreign exploitation that Harvey believes is central to capital
accumulation today – a development that may open up a path for coalitions checking
American geopolitical power.
***
One has the advantage of reading Harvey a few years after the protracted, and perhaps
insurmountable, difficulties in US-occupied Iraq have become clear and apparent. That result
calls into doubt – in a way Harvey’s narrative understandably does not, given its publication
date – the possibility of continued successful American military coercion. Its global political
legitimacy has diminished severely, to say nothing of its actual ability to accomplish
battlefield goals. At the same time, the two major American political parties have more or
less embraced neo-conservative militarism, though to obviously different extents. The
Democratic Party’s 2004 presidential candidate, John Kerry, ran on a platform that attacked
Bush not for the war itself but for poor management of it. Leading Democratic candidates in
the 2008 cycle, including the new President, meanwhile crassly chest thumped and baited
Pakistan, Iran, and other “rogue” nations, offered plans (littered with loopholes and provisos)
for long and protracted “withdrawals” from Iraq (but not of military bases), and advocated
troop escalation in Afghanistan. 116 No figures from either party show much commitment to
reconsideration of current American carte blanche policy towards Israeli militarism. Indeed,
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during the 2006 Israeli bombing of Lebanon and the roundly condemned 2008 Gaza siege,
which drew criticism even from outlets like the New York Times and CNN, many supposedly
“progressive” Democrats like Jerrold Nadler were far more vocal than their right-wing
counterparts when it came to unequivocally defending Israeli actions condemned by the major
human rights organizations. 117
This much may be a given for the Democratic Party. But what may turn out to be
diminishing American power in a number of spheres – political, economic, and military –
should not give the American left any hope in the short. A hit taken by the American node of
neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism hardly translates into a gain for a left program.
American militarism, for sure, has given rise to the seeds of an anti-capitalist opposition in
parts of Latin America, but also an equally (if not more) vigorous and repressive clerical antiimperialism in Iran. Further, nations or blocs challenging the United States can abide by the
logic of neo-liberalism just as strongly, the transformation of China into a capitalist
juggernaut “with Chinese characteristics” perhaps the best example.
Moreover, American decline in any of these spheres would result in immediate
hardship not for its elites but for the most exploited and politically de-mobilized. In the
absence of a coherent left opposition to exploit the weakness of American elites, what is there
to celebrate? What passes for an American anti-imperialist movement has adopted a
disastrous strategy of wasting energy on one-day dramaturgical existential spectacles,
marches, infantile showboating, and electoral campaigns for pro-war candidates.
Inconsequential as it was – the brief interest in Cindy Sheehan aside – this radical posturing
has more or less vanished even as public sentiment against the war (for whatever reason) has
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skyrocketed without much channel for expression. 118 Monthly Review and the sectarian
organs excepted, American left-to-centrist outlets paper over (when they do not actively
support) the imperial policies of Democratic candidates and conflate ephemeral spectacles and
fads (MoveOn, hip-hop, the Internet-organized march, blogs, etc.) with real oppositional
“movements.” This is not a left ready to turn potential American weakness into its own gain.
Perhaps this juncture and the confusing dynamics behind it – the increasingly foggy
relationship between the logics of capital and territory -- are what Harvey means when he
speaks of a new imperialism. Even if one does not fully accept all the ideas presented in both
volumes, they are enormously generative, if not optimistic, works that invite repeated
engagement. Harvey himself deserves commendation as well for resisting the acquiescence
that has infected so many of his former left peers and instead presenting a loud and clear
rejection of neo-liberalism and imperialism in all its forms.
***
Anyone who lived through the Bush years and felt more warmly towards the
preceding administration should immediately consult Robert Pollin’s Contours of Descent:
U.S. Economic Fractures and the Landscape of Global Austerity for a sobering reminder of
Clinton’s checkered record. Pollin’s volume is a crisply written and elegantly organized
account of those years and their adverse impact on the economic fortunes of millions of
Americans. A highly regarded economist at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, one of
the few outposts for left “heterodox” economics in the United States, Pollin is well schooled
in several theoretical traditions of left political economy -- but anchors much of his research
in grounded experience conducted in tandem with community activists fighting for more
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egalitarian economic policies. He is perhaps best known for his scholarship on “living wage”
ordinances that rebuts critics who claim such legislation would pose disastrous impediments
to economic growth. 119 More recently, he has led research into the creation of a new
environmentally sound “green economy,” producing a new report that will likely figure into
future discussions on potential growth sectors for American economic revival and ecological
sustainability. 120
In contrast to Brenner and Harvey’s volumes, Contours is less concerned with
providing a grand macro-structural interpretation of the recent economy and its catalysts than
with conducting a close autopsy of its recent consequences and identifying its chief winners
and losers. As in his previous body of work, Pollin is particularly interested in those
dimensions of the economy that affect Americans’ everyday experience – trends in wages and
incomes, new shifts in social service spending, and others. Though it situates its findings
within historical trends, Contours primarily concerns the 1990s and early 2000s, a narrower
focus that will aid future attempts to periodize this short but critical era.
The book is guided by a simple overarching question also running through the other
authors’ works – the gulf between rhetoric and economic reality – or as Pollin characterizes
the Clinton years specifically, “how the Clinton economy could have appeared to be
performing so well even as problems of inequality and financial instability were
deepening.” 121 Pollin fuses three extremely useful approaches for analyzing the question,
what he calls the “Marx Problem,” the “Keynes Problem,” and the “Polanyi Problem.” The
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Marx Problem centers on the “reserve army of labor,” Marx’s term for a constant unemployed
pool of workers who drive down wages and reduce employed workers’ militancy by serving
as potential replacement labor. Here, Pollin revisits how the dynamics of unemployment and
wages had changed in the late 20th-century with looming global labor market integration. The
Keynes Problem refers to the ripple effects of investment throughout other sectors of society
(for example, companies that reduce hiring because of sudden declines in investment returns)
and to the “speculative mentality” that, if reproduced widely enough, can influence equity
prices as much as any material factors. This group psychology, Pollin and Brenner both
argue, propelled the economy in the late 1990s, during which, in Pollin’s words, “what really
matters for a speculative investor is not what they think about a given company’s prospects
per se, but rather what they think other investors are thinking, since that will be what
determines where the stock price goes in the short term.” And the Polanyi Problem addresses
the need to provide some measure of social solidarity in a market economy rather than all-out,
no holds barred competition. Pollin suggests that post-WWII Keynesianism responded to
some of the concerns that Polanyi raised in his classic The Great Transformation. It
maintained steady wage growth, a minimum wage, and sought to maximize employment, all
while ensuring some measure of wealth redistribution through progressive taxation and social
spending. And it reduced the severity of the Marx Problem by recognizing (though not
always consistently) labor unions’ right to organize and collectively bargain. When
Keynesianism unraveled in the 1970s because of high inflation and increasing unemployment,
what replaced it, and what happened to the collective ethic in the process? 122 Pollin turns to
the data left in the wake of Clinton, Greenspan, and Bush for an answer.
***
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In 1992, Bill Clinton ran on a campaign attacking President Bush, Sr.’s economic
record. By 2000, in his speech to the Democratic National Convention, Clinton boasted of a
new economic dynamism: “Today, we are in the midst of the longest economic expansion in
our history. More than 22 million new jobs, the lowest unemployment in 30 years, the lowest
female unemployment in 40 years, the lowest Hispanic and African American unemployment
on record, the highest home ownership rate in our history.” 123 Furthermore, he had overseen
annual budget surpluses at the close of his term, which reversed nearly three decades of
federal deficits. It seemed, at first glance, that even the most devoted leftist curmudgeon
would have trouble finding anything problematic about his record. But Pollin reveals plenty
of blind spots in Clinton’s self-celebratory narrative. The overall picture suggests that the
same neo-liberal logic informing government policy of the 1980s carried over into the Clinton
era.
Still, Clinton did curb some of Reagan’s excesses, and Pollin gives credit where it is
due. Unlike some leftist accounts of this period, this book slices data as generously as
possible for all sides, and Pollin’s treatment of Clinton tax policy is a good example. After an
overall 2.7% tax cut for the top fifth (in income) of households from Reagan policies (and
9.1% for the top 1%), the Clinton years saw a reversal. By the end of his first administration,
the top fifth’s rates had risen by 2.6% (and by 5.1% for the top 1%). 124 As Pollin notes,
“Clinton administration did restore part of the progressive dimension of the tax system that
was lost in the 1980s, but not all of it.” 125
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The Clinton years, indeed, can be viewed as a series of occasional breaks from the
Reagan-Bush years that failed to transcend the overall parameters of neo-liberalism and the
push for reduced government intervention and faith in markets. Clinton’s much trumpeted
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides an illustrative case. The EITC’s
pool of eligible participants increased under Clinton, as did the average payout, by a little
more than $500. But against the backdrop of a neo-liberal program, Pollin argues that the
benefits of the EITC were greatly reduced. He points specifically to the most sweeping
change in Clinton’s welfare policy -- the 1996 conversion of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which set a five-year
limit on benefits. Pollin observes that “while total outlays for EITC rose (in 2001 dollars) by
$17.5 billion, from $9.3 to $26.8 billion between 1992-2000, spending on ‘family support’
grew by only $2.1 billion, from $19.1 to $21.2 billion, after having actually fallen in real
dollars for most of Clinton’s presidency.” 126 The disproportionate ratio between these figures
may increase, too, as more time elapses since the passage of the act.
Wage and poverty figures under Clinton also reflect simultaneous small steps forward
against an overall huge step backward. Under Clinton, real wages stopped declining between
1993-1996 after persistent year-to-year declines since 1986 (and a failure to ever return to
1973 levels). But during these years, rather than increase as a result of pro-active
administration policy, average wages stagnated. It was only in 1997 when wages saw an
increase under Clinton, though they failed to ever reach the levels of even the Carter years.
Pollin argues that this uptick coincided less with Clinton’s minor 1997 minimum wage
increase than with the Internet bubble, discussed shortly, which generated new jobs, reduced
unemployment, and increased worker bargaining power in the short term. But these
126
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improvements were largely contingent on a speculative bubble with aftereffects that continue
to reverberate, as Brenner and Pollin both show. Clinton’s economic reforms thus rested on a
highly unstable foundation that began collapsing shortly after he left the presidency. 127
The poverty story proceeds similarly – seeming improvement on the surface that
becomes less rosy with more context and examination. From 1993 to 2000, the poverty rate
declined sharply from 15.1% to 11.3%. Moreover, the average poverty rate over these years,
13.2%, also represented an improvement from the Reagan-Bush figure of 14%. But other
data complicates the story. Pollin notes that the “poverty gap” – the amount required to lift a
family out of poverty – actually rose during the Clinton era by a little less than $100. He
argues further that all the poverty figures must be situated against Clinton’s 1996 AFDC
legislation, which made the cost of raising a child higher for former dependents clocked out of
assistance, even though the government has not yet incorporated this into its poverty line
calculations. And like the improvements in wages, those for poverty, Pollin concludes, were
at least a partial byproduct of the bubble economy and the new jobs it generated. An overall
picture emerges of considerable short-term improvement in poverty percentage figures, but
the long-term removal of a critical safety net that has contributed to more hardship for those
still in poverty. The end of AFDC and the expansion of EITC have further entrenched the
American welfare state’s connection of certain social rights to those in the labor market. 128
Contours provides a new perspective on Clinton’s 2000 convention speech by opening
the curtain on less rosy aspects of the Clinton years. It also suggests that much of Clinton’s
accomplishments stemmed from an unstable bubble economy. But besides providing a
compact tour of what he labels the Clintonian “hollow boom,” Pollin has also made two
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important contributions to writing recent American economic history. First, like Brenner, his
findings suggest declining American economic dynamism, even with short-term speculative
attempts to prop it up. And second, Pollin identifies a fascinating conundrum of these years –
simultaneous low inflation and low unemployment – and offers a much less romantic answer
than the Clintonites for why this occurred.
***
Clinton’s exit generated many conversations about his legacy, but few mainstream
commentators conceptualized his presidency as one that ushered in a new era of speculative
finance. Numerous major policies and actions, however, lead Pollin to declare that “Clinton
put the agenda of the financial markets at the top of his administration’s concerns.” 129 The
administration’s support of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act served as the final
death knell for the pre-WWII Glass-Steagall Act. In theory, Glass-Steagall mandated
divisions between investment banking and commercial banking to reduce speculation -- but
had increasingly become dead letter due to poor enforcement. Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan also resisted pressure to impose so-called stronger margin requirements,
which would limit the amount of borrowing investors could conduct without actual cash. And
both Greenspan and Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin arranged a dramatic bailout (with the
assistance of several financial institutions) of the risky Long Term Capital Management hedge
fund in the wake of the 1997 East Asian fiscal crisis. 130
These conditions led to some astonishing consequences. Price-earnings (PE) ratios –
the ratio of equity price to actual real earnings – reached record levels. At the height of the
stock market boom, fueled especially by much hyped Internet and

129
130

Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 32-33, 60-61, 181.

Chowkwanyun 71
information technology stocks, around December 1998, the Standard & Poor’s composite
stock price index indicated a PE ratio of 44.2, an unprecedented level in American economic
history.

Price-earnings ratio for Standard & Poor’s composite stock price index in Pollin, 57

Available corporate funds (measured by corporate internal funds to total debt ratios) also
dropped to 30-year lows, from 12.7 during the era of Nixon-Ford to 9.8 under Clinton. The
corporate debt to equity ratio decreased at a staggering rate as well, from 159.2 to 83.1, which
reflected the overall inflation of equity prices. Much of the spike in equity prices came from
corporations’ buybacks of their own stock, made easier in a deregulated environment, and that
set new records ($121 billion in buybacks per year from 1994-2000 compared to $92 billion
from 1984-1990). These spikes, in turn, fueled one aspect of the Keynes Problem, a
“speculative market psychology” that fed the hopes of other investors who hoped to profit
quickly from surging prices as well. 131 This gave way to a “wealth effect” and boom in debtfueled consumer spending, driven by funds borrowed on rising asset prices. Pollin notes, too,
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that almost all the rise in consumption came from the households in the top fifth income
bracket. 132
But as Brenner also argues, the bubble-fueled “wealth effect” only went so far. Pollin
does not use Brenner’s rate of profit measure, but his comparisons of GDP largely coincide
with the Brenner argument. GDP growth during the Clinton years (3.7%) certainly
represented an improvement from the Reagan-Bush years (2.9%). But it amounted to only a
minor improvement from the Carter years (3.4%) and did not compare favorably at all to
Kennedy-Johnson (4.8%). Moreover, when Pollin disaggregates the Clinton figure into two
periods – before and after the 1996 onset of the bubble – he finds that the speculative frenzy
of the last few years appears to account for much of the improvement. From 1993-1995, the
GDP growth rate was only 3.1% (below the Carter years), and productivity growth was only
.9%, compared to 2.5% in the post-1996 period. 133 The rapid tumble into recession shortly
after Clinton’s departure only underscored the degree to which a bubble-fueled “wealth
effect” had propped up most strong economic growth.
Pollin contributes to the economic dynamism debate in more unlikely ways as well.
His analysis of how Clinton was able to balance budgets in his last few years assigns only a
slight role to faster GDP growth. Using a regression model, he identifies four leading factors
and assigns the following percentages indicating their contribution to the decline in deficits
and creation of a surplus: cutting government spending relative to GDP (54%), tax revenues
excluding capital gains (29%), capital gains revenues (10%), and faster growth (7%). 134 From
this, it is clear that the surplus came mostly from severe contractions in government spending,
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and to a much lesser extent, the brief spike in capital gains from the stock bubble. Growth
outside the financial sector, by contrast, amounted for very little in the turnaround, further
illustrating the relative weakness of Clinton-era (and post-1973 more generally) economic
growth, even during a bubble. 135
The Clinton cuts in spending, meanwhile, exacted a considerable toll on social service
and infrastructure investment. During the Clinton years, Pollin’s figures show a decline in
education spending of 23.9%, in income security of 17.6% and in transportation of 9.6%.
Apart from a political “triangulation” strategy through which he often outflanked his
Republican opponents on fiscal policy, Clinton’s other motivation for a budget hawk stance
was to reduce government demand for credit, thereby encouraging reduced interest rates and
supposedly stimulating economic growth. But the growth that did actually occur mainly
stemmed from the financial sector (with heavy assistance from lax regulation). Phrased in
terms of the Polanyi Problem, had we substituted stockholder protections in place of social
protections?
This survey of the Clinton years suggests as much. Readers will have to consider
whether “neo-liberalism,” as Harvey periodizes it, sufficiently captures changes in the last
decade of the 20th-century. While Clinton certainly curbed some of Reagan and Bush’s
policies, particularly in the tax code, he did not do so to an extent that restored it completely
to pre-Reagan levels. In other areas, Clinton succeeded where Reagan-Bush did not – the
abolition of AFDC, further cuts in social spending, more formal deregulation of the financial
services industry, and the turning of balanced budget hawking (at all costs) into actual policy,
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thus further repudiating the Keynesian program. He oversaw the near-term roots, too, of the
current economic volatility that has now lasted for a decade with protracted consequences still
to come. Future historians, of course, will debate the degree to which Greenspan and
Clinton’s agendas converged and diverged, and the extent to which their offices hold
responsibility for the bubble (versus media outlets and the financial institutions themselves).
But Pollin’s dissection is a first step to countering the self-hagiography heard on the
Democratic National Convention floor in 2000.
***
There is another reason to consider the Clinton era as a distinct phase within neoliberalism, should we accept the term. Its unemployment and inflation rates were a departure
both from the classical Keynesian pattern and the figures after the mid-1970s. Under Clinton,
both unemployment and inflation reached new and simultaneous lows, ending the historic
“tradeoff” between the two. According to most economic accounts, the low unemployment
rates under Clinton should have yielded higher inflation because of increased demand. Yet
both unemployment and inflation reached new lows – 4.0% and 3.4%, respectively, by the
end of Clinton’s term. 136 These were much touted by the press and Clinton himself without
much analysis as to the underlying causes of the figures.
Pollin’s thesis deserves close scrutiny as historians unravel the low unemploymentlow inflation conundrum. He argues that stagnant, persistently low wages, declining demand,
and cuts in social services all limited consumer demand and purchasing power that might
otherwise have resulted in more inflation in another era. 137 Providing additional support for
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this claim are Pollin’s figures (previously mentioned) indicating that most increase in
consumer activity occurred only in the top fifth income
bracket. The degree of the low wages is put into further perspective when compared against
steadily increasing productivity rates, which by orthodox economists’ accounts, are supposed
to also increase wages.

Average Real Wages and Productivity Level in the United States in Pollin, 43

What caused these low wages? For one, Clinton’s 1997 minimum wage increase failed to
come close to reaching 1973 levels, when real wages first began to decline sharply. Pollin
argues that the decline in unionism during the Clinton years made workers far more reluctant
to agitate for higher wages than they might have been during a more hospitable era for labor.
And because of new trade agreements and foreign investment, Pollin also invokes the Marx
Problem to suggest that workers’ perception of additional outsourcing (real or not) may have
reduced militancy. 138 This is hardly the last word on these topics. But Pollin deftly connects
the labor movement’s woes, trade policy, stagnant wages, and a major new macro-economic
trends (the end of the unemployment-inflation tradeoff) and provides highly generative
ground for future scholars.
***
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Alan Greenspan will be remembered most for his series of steep interest rate cuts in
the early years of the Bush administration, as the Internet bubble of the late Clinton years
inflated, burst, and brought down into recession much of the economy it had helped prop up.
Contours usefully points out that early declines in GDP, the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock
market index, and capacity utilization all began to fall well before the September 11, 2001
World Trade Center attacks, a common (and erroneous) starting point in narratives of recent
economic trouble. 139 Likewise, Greenspan’s rate cuts, a key near-term cause of the current
volatility, began in January 2001 and declined by January 2002 to 1.73%, a 40-year low. 140
Pollin’s analysis of the cuts here dovetails closely with Brenner’s; both more or less foresaw
the current mortgage bubble.
But Pollin is somewhat more precise about the nature of the cuts and how they failed
to spur consistent growth. He points out that the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) set by the Federal
Reserve generally influences other interest rates but rarely to as large of an extent as the FFR
itself. Thus when the FFR reached an all-time low of 1.24%, the mortgage rate fell only to
6.05% and the Baa corporate bond rate fell to only 7.45%. 141 The latter, he argues, failed to
stimulate much corporate borrowing and exposed the limited ability of the Federal Reserve’s
critical tool – the rate adjustment – to reverse a recession for which it was partly responsible.
The decline of the mortgage rate, though not initially that large, nonetheless successfully
resulted in a sharp 30% increase in borrowing. This persisted in subsequent years, much of it
spurred by high-risk, lightly regulated private equity firms and financial institutions’ hedge
funds that saw “real estate holdings as an alternative to equities” in the wake of the stock
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market collapse. And as early as 2002, warnings on the rapid rise in prices were issued (and
mostly ignored). 142
Unfortunately, Pollin’s publication date limits the fullness of the housing story, which
is still unfolding and accelerated in the past few years as more and more speculators and
lenders entered the real estate market. But the signal accomplishment here is the critical link
that Pollin, like Brenner, draws between Clinton-era deregulation, the Internet boom and
bubble, and its Greenspan-abetted real estate counterpart almost a decade later. This
connection has been largely neglected in many popular media accounts. 143 And while it is
facile to claim there are no differences between Clinton and Bush – the latter’s three tax cuts,
thoroughly chronically by Pollin, perhaps the best evidence – it is also true that the
deregulation and contraction in social service spending that began under Clinton have
severely exacerbated Bush’s worst excesses. 144 As Pollin puts it: “To therefore push a
Reagan-style agenda onto a government sector that has already experienced ‘the end of the
big government era’ under Clinton will mean that any further contractions in social spending
will cut even deeper to the bone.” 145 He deserves much credit for assembling Contours, an
important reminder to those who would (understandably) feel nostalgic for the Clinton years.
“In short, rhetoric aside, the Clinton economy was never an alternative to neo-liberalism,”
Pollin concludes, “but rather a variation on the orthodox model that illuminates powerfully

142

Ibid., 90-94.
As for Greenspan himself, many of these same accounts have also drawn too sharp a contrast between him
and Paul Volcker, remembered for his record high interest rates. But this is an ahistorical comparison. Both
operated well within the confines of neo-liberal logic and made policy decisions appropriate for their particular
historical circumstances. In an era of high inflation, Volcker made a tradeoff between lower interest rates and
higher inflation, contracting the credit supply to reduce the latter and diminishing working-class strength in the
process. Greenspan operated in a much different context. He faced a recession but fairly low inflation and an
even weaker labor movement, and therefore attempted to jumpstart the economy with low rates. Each, however,
used state apparatuses in the service of capital while espousing neo-liberal rhetoric condemning it.
144
Ibid., 94-102.
145
Ibid., 115.
143

Chowkwanyun 78
why a real alternative is so badly needed.” 146 Recent reconsiderations in the popular press of
Clinton’s policy contribution to the current turbulence seem to have vindicated Pollin’s
prescient book. 147
***
Contours offers the most concrete set of alternatives (Brenner says nothing on the
matter, while Harvey’s comments on strategy are mostly negative.) Pollin calls for financial
re-regulation but with better enforcement mechanisms and more consistent, across-the-board
application to prevent exploitation of clever exceptions and loopholes by financial
institutions. He has also advocated the so-called Tobin tax, a small commission that the
government would collect for financial transactions in the hope of discouraging speculative
whims. And he makes the case again for raising margin requirements that would reduce highrisk investment on borrowed funds alone with little to no cash. Given the dramatic turbulence
of the past year, these may be realistic, medium-term goals.
Pollin concludes by calling for a return to Keynesian policies, particularly full
employment at decent wages – once codified in the immediate post-WWII period but never
actually realized to this day. Acknowledging the legitimacy of those who argue that such a
policy would result in inflationary pressure, he points to Swedish state planning that regularly
adjusted targeted employment percentages according to their potential threat to the inflation
problem. A year ago, raising Scandinavian social democracy and economic planning as a
potential model would have seemed questionable. Policy proposals, no matter how sound or
well-designed, are more or less dead on arrival without precise elaboration of the political
strategy required for enacting them. It had become fashionable in left-to-centrist circles of
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late to call simply for a “new New Deal” or reincarnations of certain programs like the Works
Progress Administration. But such calls, tepid as they may seem to some leftists, skipped the
crucial discussion of how this would come about given the constricting policy milieu that
Harvey and Pollin detail. But now the economic context has changed so strikingly, rapidly
widening the parameters of debate. An author in the moderate New Republic recently
declared: “A decade ago, I might have been embarrassed to admit that I was raised on Marx
and Marxism, but I am convinced that the left is coming back. Friedrich Hayek is going to be
out; Friedrich Engels in.” 148 Still, the difficulty President Obama faced in passing an already
diluted stimulus rescue package suggests that more expansive overhauls will not happen
without additional extra-economic imperatives and forces, however dire the changes in fiscal
tectonics. Commentators from centrist to leftist like to repeat mothballed cliches about the
need for “pressure” or “movements” -- but disaggregating these stock keywords into
something more concrete and precise remains elusive.
With the exception of Harvey’s analysis of social movements, these works are mostly
devoted to providing a structural picture of barriers the left faces. It is unfair, of course, to
critique them for not addressing the positive strategy question more fully (or at all). That is
not what they set out to do. At the same time, it is hard not to notice that structural analyses
often hold more appeal for left intellectuals, while book-light, theater-heavy movement
activity attracts leftists or activists on the ground, especially those of current younger
generations. Something should be done to bridge the insights of these authors to those
implementing whatever strategies eventually arise.
***
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Still, these works succeed enormously by leaving activists and scholars with a
provocative set of debates and questions. If we accept these authors’ view that the American
economy (and those of two other world powers, Germany and Japan) has stagnated, is this
necessarily a sign of weakness in the face of no coherent political alternative? Is the crisis
really a “crisis” with no movement to exploit it? And perhaps most important, after the
implosion of the Internet and speculative housing markets (along with the collapse or gigantic
losses of many financial institutions), what are the next outlays or potential growth sectors of
the sort that eventually helped the United States recover from the Great Depression after
World War II? 149
Capitalism’s survival depends, too, on its reproduction in day-to-day life and consent
(or coercion) of those living under it. Even if the American economy is not as dynamic and is
far more volatile than it has been in decades, what is really at stake if it is the only system
most Americans and their representatives accept? Strategic junctures also exist. Drawing
careful distinctions among left traditions, of course, risks lapsing into the sectarian warfare
that imploded much of the left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, too
encompassing a “big tent, all good, all in” approach to oppositional politics has allowed the
left to stall and delay confrontation of very real differences among its members. Movements
that shun demands on the state will have very different strategies than those that view
grabbing state power as central to any eventual left society. The Marxist left faces an
additional dilemma in placing a premium on controlling the state but having little to no place
in the mainstream political parties, both of which have shifted heavily rightward in the past
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few decades. Yet third-party campaigns of recent years have amounted to little more than
quixotic vanity shows and do not appear politically promising. And what are the pros and
cons of single-issuism or localist movements? How well do these movements incorporate a
coherent critique of capitalism into their analyses, if at all? How effective are movements that
only organize and win on a small scale (community level) to the overall left project?
Analytically, the core-periphery model remains dominant in analyzing imperialism and
empire? But does almost inevitable spatial expansion (and plunder) play as heavy a role as
Harvey assigns to it? What do we make of Brenner’s heterodox emphasis on competition,
rather than exploitation and class struggle, as the chief theme in the post-WWII economic
story? Answering many of these questions on economic change and social movements will
also require some disciplinary house cleaning, for the history of the economy and the history
of labor and social movements are more often studied apart (and in different departments),
even as the interplay between them could not be more obvious.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe, if China forms its own regional economic
bloc and home market within East Asia, what will the consequences be for the United States,
which relies heavily on it for imports and debt-fueled investment? Is China the new emerging
counter-power, as many claim, to the United States? What of its own internal contradictions,
increasingly evident in the past year? Less dramatic examples of counter-blocs come from
Latin America and the Middle East, though both are critical in supplying to the United States
energy, namely oil. The United States’s centrality to the recent fortunes of China, the parallel
woes of Japan, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis are important episodes in the history of
currency politics. Brenner’s analysis of how powerful states engineer currency rates, often to
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the detriment of those not privy to the proceedings, identifies an important source of volatility
that deserves continued attention from left scholars.
Finally, with more retrospection on the past few decades, historians should scrutinize
the term “neo-liberalism,” which is threatening to become a catch-all, everything-yet-nothing
term. How precise is it in actually describing the emergence of a distinctly new phase in
capitalist development? Does it merely occupy the extreme end of the capitalist spectrum?
Or are there distinct developments within it that justify a new term? The Clinton presidency
may serve as a useful concrete case. How should the left and scholars situate the sweeping
changes of the Clintonian economic policy (the formal end of long-standing financial
regulation, the AFDC) within the post-WWII period? Does it represent a distinct phase in
accelerated “financialization,” as Pollin would probably argue, or is Harvey’s date of origin
(the early 1980s) more appropriate? What the next eight years bring for the history of neoliberalism – if that is indeed the right term – are an open question.
***
These questions and debates – and the works of Brenner, Harvey, and Pollin -suggest numerous strategic, intellectual, and structural impediments for the left and much less
uncertainty (not optimism) for the near-term. Perry Anderson of 2000 may well have been
right. But as the young Russell Jacoby and Adolph Reed remind us, lapsing into fatalism only
ends up ironically turning the left critique into a demobilizing arm of capitalism itself. We
should therefore be thankful that brilliant thinkers like Robert Brenner, David Harvey, and
Robert Pollin exist to guide us through the trenches and the long haul and fight ahead.
Will 2008 be for the left what 1973 was for neo-liberalism? Naïve optimism is
foolish. But the above suggestion is not as absurd as it would have seemed a decade ago. . .

